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MIRANDA AND THE REHNQUIST COURT:
HAS THE PENDULUM SWUNG TOO FAR?
INTRODUCTION
The arrest of Ernesto Miranda and his subsequent interroga-
tion on Wednesday, March 13, 1963 triggered a groundbreaking
and controversial United States Supreme Court decision, Miranda
v. Arizona.' Arresting him on rape charges, the police brought Er-
nesto Miranda down to the station and began the interrogation. 2
The officers isolated Miranda throughout the entire interrogation
process.' At no point in this process did the interrogators clearly
inform Miranda of his constitutional right to be free from com-
pelled self-incrimination and his right to have an attorney present
during the interrogation.''
384 U.S. 436,491 (1966).
Id. at 491-92.
" See id.; see also LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW, AND POLITICS 11-13 (1983).
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492. In Miranda, the Court did not discuss the facts in extensive
detail. See id. at 491-92, At least one commentator notes that when the police placed Ernesto
Miranda in the line-up, the victim failed to positively identify him as her attacker. See BAKER,
supra note 3, at 12. This commentator further indicates that, when Miranda asked the police
how he did in the line-up, the police said that he "flunked." See id.
In addition to Ernesto Miranda's case, the Court also ruled on the admissibility of
confessions obtained in three companion cases: Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States,
and Califermia v. Stewart, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57,493-99. In Vignera v. New York, the
police picked up Michael Vignera, brought him to the station and questioned him. Alter
they formally placed him under arrest, the assistant district attorney then proceeded to
question Vignera. The trial record reflected that at no time during the interrogation did the
police warn Vignera of his rights to remain silent or to have an attorney present during the
questioning, ld. at 493-94.
In Westover v. United States, the police arrested Carl Calvin Westover in connection with
two robberies in Kansas City. The authorities brought him to the station, placed him in a
line-up, and booked him. The officers then interrogated him on the same evening and, after
he denied the crimes, interrogated him the following day. According to the record, the local
authorities never read Westover his rights. The Federal Bureau of Investigation then in-
terceded because Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Three special agents
of the F.B.I. interrogated Westover for over two hours and obtained a signed confession
from the suspect. The agents claimed at trial that they read him his rights before interrogating
him. Westover had been in custody and interrogated at length by both federal and local
authorities during that time period. Id. at 495-96.
In California v. Stewart, the police arrested Roy Allen Stewart at his home and searched
the premises. Finding evidence linking Stewart with five robberies, the police brought Stewart
to the station along with his wife and three others who had been visiting with the Stewarts.
Stewart and the others were both jailed and interrogated. The police held Stewart in custody
for live days and interrogated him nine times. The interrogating officers isolated Stewart
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In its landmark Miranda decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that police could no longer use confessions obtained
from criminal suspects as evidence in the criminal's prosecution
unless the suspect confessed after the police warned him or her of
the constitutional rights to remain silent and to speak to an attor-
ney.' The Miranda Court reasoned that the in-house interrogation
of criminal suspects is an inherently coercive procedure. 6 In order
to combat the compelling pressures associated with an interrogation,
police officers must warn suspects of their rights prior to an inter-
rogation to provide them with the opportunity to exercise the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.' If the suspect invoked the right to
remain silent, the Court mandated that "the interrogation must
cease." In addition, the Court stressed that, if a suspect requested
an attorney, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is pres-
ent."' Thus, the Miranda Court established new procedures that law
enforcement officers must follow when interrogating criminal sus-
pects. i°
In creating new rules for interrogating criminal suspects, the
Miranda Court emphasized that the admissibility of a defendant's
confession given during a period of custodial interrogation depends
not only on whether the police "issued a warning," but in addition,
on whether the defendant has expressly waived his or her rights to
remain silent and to speak with an attorney." According to the
Miranda Court, if a suspect has waived his or her rights and con-
fessed, courts, in determining the confession's admissibility, must
look to the circumstances surrounding the waiver to determine if
the suspect waived these rights knowingly, intelligently and volun-
tarily.' 2 In determining whether a suspect waived his or her rights,
the Court cautioned that an individual's silence following the inter-
rogators' reading of the rights or the fact that the police eventually
obtained a confession could not support the presumption of
during each period of questioning, except for the first interrogation in which Stewart was
confronted by an accusing witness. The record lacked reference to any warnings given to
Stewart by the police during the interrogations. M. at 497-99.
/d. at 478-79.
Id. at 467.
Id.
'Id. at 473-74.
9 Id. at 474.
'"Id. at 479.
't Id. at 475-76.
= 2 Id. at 475.
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waiver." Because the Court hinged the admissibility of confessions
following a period of custodial interrogation on the defendant's
waiver of his or her right to remain silent,t 4 it is this particular
aspect of its decision that has undergone significant change in the
last twenty-two years.
In a number of cases decided after Miranda, the Court has
interpreted broadly the requirement that the defendant. waive his
or her rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." For exam-
ple, the Court has held that a confession obtained during a second
interrogation that followed after a suspect exercised his right to
remain silent is admissible so long as the police "scrupulously hon-
ored" the suspect's initial request to remain silent.'" The Court also
has upheld the validity of an implied waiver of the right to have an
attorney present during interrogation based on inferences drawn
13 Id. In listing the criteria for an acceptable waiver, the Miranda Court observed that
IAJn express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement
and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute
a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of
the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession
was in fact eventually obtained.
Id. at 475. The Court further cited an earlier precedent that held that "[p]resuming waiver
from a silent record is impermissible ....The record must show, or there must be an
allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently
and understandingly rejected the offer.. . .Anything less is not waiver." Id. (citing earnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962)). The Court also provided examples of unacceptable
waivers:
[W]hatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused,
the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a
statement is made is strong evidence that the accused (lid not validly waive his
rights. 111 these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a
statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the
interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a
voluntary relinquishment of the privilege[against self-incrimination]. Moreover,
any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver
will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.
Id, at 476,
' 4 Id.
See Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828,
on remand 205 Conn. 437, 534 A.2d 219 (1987); Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986);
Moran v. B.urbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Fare v. Michael G., 442 U.S. 707, reh'g denied, 444
U.S. 887 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96 (1975), an remand, People v. Mosley, 72 Mich. App. 289, 249 N.W.2d 393 (1976), aff'd,
400 Mich. 181, '254 N.W.2d '29, eert. denied, Michigan v. Mosley, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
For an excellent discussion of the limitations placed on Miranda by the Burger Court,
see Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
405-34 (1982).
In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975).
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from a suspect's actions and words." Furthermore, the Court has
held that a suspect's request to speak with an individual other than
an attorney may effectuate an implied waiver of the right to have
an attorney present during interrogation if such request is followed
by a voluntary confession.' 8
 Finally, the Court has refused to inter-
pret Miranda to require police officers to inform suspects, prior to
their decision whether to waive the right to an attorney, that an
attorney has already been provided for them.' 9
 Thus, the Court has
limited Miranda's scope by defining broadly what constitutes a de-
fendant's waiver of his or her fifth amendment rights.
In three recent cases, the Court has expanded further its def-
inition of what constitutes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver. In the 1986 decision of Colorado v. Connelly, the Court upheld
the voluntariness of a mentally incompetent individual's waiver of
his rights to remain silent and to speak to an attorney, and noted
that only coercive governmental activity can support a finding of
involuntariness. 2° Similarly, in the 1987 decision of Connecticut v.
Barrett, the Court held that, although a criminal suspect had re-
quested an attorney prior .to signing a written confession, the sus-
pect's request did not reflect an incomplete understanding of the
consequences of the limited invocation of the right to counsel so as
to bar the prosecution from introducing oral statements that the
suspect voluntarily made during the interrogation." Finally, again
in 1987, the Court in Colorado v. Spring held that a suspect's waiver
of his rights to remain silent and to speak to an attorney applied to
all of the criminal charges that the police wished to discuss during
an interrogation, not merely the criminal charges that the suspect
considered to be the interrogation's focus. 22
 Thus, these recent
Supreme Court cases demonstrate a trend towards limiting the
Miranda decision's application by defining broadly what constitutes
a valid waiver.
" See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
18
 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979). In upholding the suspect's waiver of
his fifth amendment rights, the Fare Court held that the suspect's request for a probation
officer, in conjunction with a failure to request an attorney, was a factor that could he
considered in determining whether the suspect's confession was voluntary. Id. at 727-28.
Essentially, the Court held that a suspect's request for a probation officer is not necessarily
sufficient to invoke the suspect's fifth amendment rights. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that
the suspect's subsequent confession was sufficient to effectuate an implied waiver of the right
to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Id.
19
 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
20 Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523-24 (1986).
21
 Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828, 832 (1987).
22
 Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct 851, 859 (1987).
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The trend evidenced by the post-Miranda cases is predictable
in light of the changes in the Court's membership over the last
twenty-two years." These membership changes resulted in a strong
conservative bloc that possesses a judicial philosophy hostile to Mi-
randa's logic. 24 In particular, the recent appointment of William
Rehnquist as Chief Justice, and the appointments of conservatives
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy as Associate Justices, suggests
that it is likely that the Court will continue to narrow the Miranda
decision. Further narrowing of Miranda, however; may not be in
society's best interests. Although the Miranda Court went too far in
providing criminals with a means for escaping convictions by ex-
ploiting technical violations of its bright-line prophylactic rules,
analysis of the recent cases decided by the Rehnquist Court dem-
onstrates that, in the Connelly case, the Court has undercut the
Miranda decision's viability as a constitutional safeguard by creating
rigid rules hinging the involuntariness of a confession on the exis-
tence of police coercion.
This note analyzes the effect of the Court's redefinition of what
constitutes a valid waiver of the constitutional safeguards set forth
in the Miranda decision. Section I traces the history of Miranda from
its origins to recent cases in which a largely conservative Court has
narrowed significantly the decision's mandates." Specifically, sub-
section A discusses the pre-Miranda standard of determining a
confession's admissibility." Subsection B reviews the Miranda deci-
sion. 27 Subsection C examines Supreme Court cases decided sub-
sequent to Miranda. 28 In particular, subsection D discusses the three
most recent cases that narrowed further the Miranda decision's
effect through broad interpretations of the knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary components of the waiver requirement." Section II
analyzes the Miranda decision and the subsequent cases decided by
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts that have substantially expanded
the category of acceptable waivers. 3 t" Next, this section examines the
25 See Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 405-06; Crossley, Miranda and the State Constitution:
State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VANO. L. REV. 1693,1695 (1986); BAKER, supra note 4, at 347-
48.
24 See Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 405-06; Crossley, supra note 23, at 1695; BAKER,
supra note 3, at 347-98.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 32-196.
"See infra text accompanying notes 32-58.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 59-99.
"See infra text accompanying notes 100-136.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 137-196.
3" See infra text accompanying notes 197-297.
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post-Miranda decisions against the backdrop of a Court which has
shifted from a once liberal majority, led by Chief Justice Earl War-
ren, to a dominant conservative bloc under Chief Justice William
Rehnquist."' The note concludes that Miranda's original dictates
were overbroad in limiting the discretion of trial judges and shield-
ing criminals from effective prosecution, and thus properly limited
by the Rehnquist Court's decisions in Connecticut v. Barrett and Col-
orado v. Spring. In Colorado v. Connelly, however, the Court has gone
too far in undermining the Miranda decision's constitutional safe-
guards by creating a rigid approach excluding mental capacity from
the relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis and
treating waivers as voluntary unless police overreaching exists.
1. THE EVOLUTION OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
Although the Miranda decision broke new ground by creating
rules governing the interrogation process, the Supreme Court ac-
tually began paving the way for Miranda many years earlier. Prior
to Miranda, the Court used a totality of the circumstances test that
focused on the circumstances surrounding a confession to deter-
mine whether a suspect confessed voluntarily. In Miranda, the Court
created new rules for dispelling the coercion inherent in the inter-
rogation process. These rules hinged the confession's admissibility
on the reading of a suspect's rights, and on whether the suspect
had expressly waived these rights. The Miranda Court, therefore,
shifted the analysis from a case-by-case approach to bright-line
rules. Following Miranda, the Burger Court began to narrow Mi-
randa by expanding broadly the category of acceptable waivers
through a totality of the circumstances analysis, thus upholding
confessions that would have been inadmissible under a strict reading
of Miranda. Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court has followed the
Burger Court's lead in using the defendant's waiver of his or her
rights to limit the Miranda decision's effects.
A. Precursors to Miranda: Voluntariness and the Totality of the
Circumstances Test.
In creating a framework for effective government while not
unduly hampering individuals' freedoms, the founding fathers in-
3 ' See infra text accompanying notes 236-255.
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corporated the Bill of Rights into the Constitution of the United
States." The Bill contained amendments enumerating many of the
freedoms enjoyed by the American people and limited the federal
government's power to encroach upon these freedoms." One im-
portant freedom, recognized by, the founding fathers in the fifth
amendment, is each individual's right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination in criminal trials." Until 1964, however, this con-
stitutional right applied only to defendant's charged in federal crim-
inal actions." The only means a defendant had to reverse a convic-
tion due to illegal actions by state officials lay in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment."" Thus, courts analyzed state
law claims based on the fourteenth amendment and federal law
claims based on the fifth amendment.
The historical approach to confession cases revolved around
the Court's use of a voluntariness test which focused attention on
the circumstances surrounding the confession in order to determine
if the accused did in fact confess voluntarily. In the 1884 decision
of Hopt v. Utah, the U.S. Supreme Court first noted that a statement
would be involuntary and thus inadmissible if the suspect confessed
on the basis of promises or inducements made by those individuals
who conducted the interrogation."' The Court's focus in confession
cases revolved primarily around the common law doctrine of trust-
worthiness of the confession, rejecting as inadmissible and untrus-
tworthy confessions that did not arise from the voluntary choice of
"See Crossley. supra note 23, at 1696.
" Id.
34 The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person...shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .." U.S. CONS'''. amend. V.
35 See Crossley, supra note 23, at 1694; see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 69-72. During the
first half of the twentieth century, an ongoing debate took place within the United States
Supreme Court concerning whether to extend the Bill of Rights and make those provisions
applicable to the states by total incorporation of' the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 69-72, It was not until 1964 that the
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment was binding on the states. See Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
.91 See Crossley, supra note 23, at 1697.
" Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S, 574,585 (1884). The Hopi Court stated:
Mhe confession appears to have been made either in consequence of induce-
ments of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge
preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such
person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference
to the charge, to deprive him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to
make the confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Id.
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the suspect." The Court analyzed the "special circumstances" sur-
rounding the confession in order to determine its trustworthiness."
The Supreme Court later recognized, in Bram v. United States,
that police interrogations encompassing the use of threats or prom-
ises to induce a suspect's confession also rendered that confession
inadmissible as involuntary.° In reaching this result, however, the
Bram Court referred to the fifth amendment as a basis for rejecting
compelled confessions. 4 ' Thus, the Court applied the totality of the
circumstances test as a filter to prevent untrustworthy, involuntary
confessions, in violation of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, from tainting the fact-finding process in federal
criminal trials.
Illegal actions by state officials posed a different problem for
the Court. Because the fifth amendment did not reach actions by
state officials, the Court focused on the shocking actions of the
interrogators in ruling that a fourteenth amendment due process
violation occurred.42 In Brown v. Mississippi, the Court applied the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to overturn the
convictions of three poor, illiterate black men because the police
extracted their confessions through physical torture as One of the
suspects had been hung from the limb of a tree and whipped until
he confessed. The others were taken to jail, forced to strip and lay
over chairs, and were then beaten with a buckle-studded strap in
order to induce their confessions." The Supreme Court held that
these actions by state officials constituted a violation of the due
"' 4. NISSMAN, E. HAGEN 8c P. BROOKS, LAW OF CONFESSIONS, 4-5 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as NISSMAN].
'49 Hopi, 110 U.S. at 583,585-86. -
40 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
41 Id. The Bram Court stated:
[tin criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is con-
trolled by that portion of the fifth amendment to the constitution [sic] of the
United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal
case, to be a witness against himself.'
Id. at 542-43.
The Bram Court also cited a criminal law treatise, noting that:
[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is,
[it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence.
Id. at 542-43 (citing 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES, 478 (6th ed.)).
" Nissmi(N, supra note 38, at 7-8.
4 ' 297 U.S. 278,281,285-86 (1936)
44 Id. at 281-82.
• r
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment: 15 Thus, Brown intro-
duced the use of the due process clause to check the barbarous acts
of state officials during periods of custodial interrogation.
In shaping its standards for determining the admissibility of
confessions, the Court began to develop its totality of the eircurn-
" Id, at 286. Because Brown involved coercion by state officials, as opposed to officials
of the federal government, the Court relied on fourteenth amendment due process grounds
to render the confessions inadmissible. Id. at 285-86. Applying the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the states, the Court noted that: "The Statehs are] free to regulate
the procedures of [their] courts in accordance with [their] own conceptions of policy, unless
in doing so it 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at 285 (quoting language from Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 105 (1934) and Rogers v. Peck,199 U.S. 425,434 (1905)). The Court
further held that "[i]t would he difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense
of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process." Id, at 286. Although Brown involved physical coercion, a clear violation of due
process, the Court, in subsequent cases, indicated that physical brutality is not the only form
of police overreaching.
In many instances, the police used psychological overbearing to induce criminal suspects
LO render incriminating statements. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (196(I), the appel-
lant confessed to robbery during a lengthy interrogation. Id. at 204. Following the confession,
the appellant was examined by physicians and declared to be insane. Id. at 201. The Court
held that given time appellant's mental incompetence, the lengthy interrogation and atmo-
sphere of compulsion sufficiently undermined the appellant's ability to make a voluntary
statement. Id, at 207-408. In a number of eases following Blackburn, the Court applied the
voluntariness test through the fourteenth amendment due process clause to combat various
forms of police coercion. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (police officers'
threats that suspect would be deprived or state financial aid and that her children would be
taken away from her unless she cooperated constituted coercion); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 528 (1963) (keeping suspect incommunicado for 16 hours and refusing to allow him to
call his wife constituted police coercion); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S, 534 (1901) (threat-
ening suspect that his ailing wife would be brought clown to the station unless lie cooperated
constituted coercion).
In Rogers v. Richmond, the Court modified the due process analysis by rejecting the
common law trustworthiness doctrine as a basis for admitting a suspect's confession. Rogers,
365 U.S. at 540-41. Writing for the majority of the Court, justice Frankfurter noted that:
... To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may he and have been, to an
unascertained extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional prin-
ciple of excluding confessions that arc not voluntary does not rest on this
consideration. Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due
Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use
of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating
evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed.
'Despite such verification, confessions were found to be the product of consti-
tutionally impermissible methods in their inducement. Since a defendant had
been subjected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused
should not be subjected, we were constrained to find that the procedures leading
to his conviction had failed to allbrd him that due process of the law which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
Id. As a result, the Rogers decision placed a premium on the defendant's due process rights
at the expense of the probative value or the confession obtained during the interrogation.
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stances analysis. In Culombe v. Connecticut, the Court listed a number
of factors that fall within the totality of the circumstances analysis."
When applying the totality of the circumstances analysis, courts
must look to factors such as the atmosphere of the interrogation,
the conditions of detention, the attitudes of the interrogating offi-
cers, the refusal to allow a suspect to see an attorney, the length of
the interrogation, and the physical and mental state of the defen-
dant.47
 These factors, according to the Court, facilitate the deter-
mination of the voluntariness of a suspect's confession." Thus, the
totality of the circumstances approach provided the foundation for
the Court's analysis of confession cases in the years preceding the
Miranda decision.
In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Malloy v. Hogan, held that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, first ad-
dressed in Bram v. United States, applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. 4" In extending the fifth amendment to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court noted the difficulty in applying separate federal standards
to determine the confessions' voluntariness based solely on the na-
ture of the forum. 5° In state proceedings, the Court applied the
due process approach that looked to the surrounding circumstances
and focused on the brutality of the tactics and procedures employed
by the interrogators to extract a confession.'' Federal proceedings,
46
 367 U.S. 568,601-02 (1961).
47 1d. In addressing the factors included in a totality of the circumstances analysis, the
Court, through justice Frankfurter, stated:
No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally-impermissible interrogation has
been evolved: neither extensive cross questioning ... nor undue delay in ar-
raignment ... nor failure to caution a prisoner ... nor refusal to permit
communication with friends and legal counsel at stages in the proceeding when
the prisoner is still only a suspect ....
Each of these factors, in company with all of the surrounding circumstances
— the duration and conditions of detention (if the confessor has been detained),
the manifest attitude of the police towards him, his physical and mental state, the
diverse pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control
— is relevant. The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly
established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of
voluntariness. Is the confession the product of a free and unconstrained choice
by its maker? 1f it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If
it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.
Id. (emphasis added).
"Id.
49 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
50 Id. at 11.
51 NISSMAN, supra note 38, at 7-9.
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however, focused the Court's attention on the suspect and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the confession to determine its voluntari-
ness in light of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation." Thus, after Malloy, courts applied the federal standard in
both federal and state criminal trials to determine whether the
suspect confessed voluntarily in accordance with the fifth amend-
ment.
In the same year that the Court decided Malloy, the Court, in
Escobedo v. Illinois, recognized a criminal suspect's sixth amendment
right to consult with an attorney prior to the interrogation process. 53
In Escobedo, the police brought the suspect to the station for ques-
tioning about the murder of the defendant's brother in law, and
falsely informed him that his friend, a co-defendant, already had
given them a statement as to the suspect's guilt. 54 In addition, the
police refused to let the suspect see his attorney who was waiting
for him, down the hall, throughout the interrogation process. 55 In
reversing Escobedb's conviction, the Court noted that the police had
not conducted routine questioning, but instead, focused their ef-
forts on the suspect to obtain a confession." Thus, the Escohedo
Court concluded that the interrogators' failure to allow the suspect
to consult his lawyer before the interrogation constituted a violation
of the suspect's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel."
The Escobedo decision, however, received varying interpreta-
tions at the hands of state and federal judges. Some judges limited
Escobedo to its specific facts, refusing to extend its holding to cases
with fact patterns not congruent with the Escohedo circumstances.
Others applied a broad interpretation notwithstanding the absence
of the specific circumstances supporting the Escobedo decision."
52 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-7. In applying the fifth amendment to the states, justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, noted that:
Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state
officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession
was "free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats
or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,
nor by the exertion of any improper influence ...." In other words the person
must have been compelled to incriminate himself .
Id. at 7 (citing Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,542-43 (1897)).
" 378 U.S. 478,492 (1964).
5 ' Id. at 479.
57' Id. at 481-82.
5f'
	 at 485.
57 Id, at 490-91.
5 ' Israel, Police Interrogalion and the Supreme Cowl — The Latest Round, in A NEW LOOK
GoloTssioNs: Esc:mu:Do — "NE SECOND ROUND 22 ( J. George ed. 1967). Although the
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Thus, the Escobedo decision failed to effectively resolve many of the
issues arising from the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to custodial interrogations.
In sum, the Court in cases prior to Miranda recognized the
dangers of police overreaching in the interrogation process and
created the totality of the circumstances test as a means of deter-
mining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession in federal actions.
On the state level, the Court's due process analysis invalidated many
forms of police coercion such as physical brutality and psychological
overbearing. In applying the fifth amendment to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, Malloy enabled criminal suspects to
apply the suspect-oriented voluntariness test and raise fifth amend-
ment issues in a state forum. Finally, with Escobedo, the Court rec-
ognized a suspect's sixth amendment right to have assistance of
counsel before participating in the interrogation process. In rec-
ognizing this right, the Court noted the inherent compulsion in
custodial interrogations and stated that the assistance of counsel
could protect a suspect from potential police coercion. Escobedo,
however, failed to effectively resolve many of the issues surrounding
custodial interrogations and thus; the Court needed to address these
issues at least one more time.
B. The Miranda Decision
Prior to Miranda, police cloaked suspects' interrogations in se-
crecy. 59 Although earlier cases established the totality of the circum-
stances test, prior to Miranda no bright-line rules existed to combat
police overreaching. Police officers continued to isolate suspects in
interrogation rooms and conduct interrogations with only officers
and suspects present." The isolated nature of these interrogations,
often referred to as "incommunicado" interrogations, reflected stan-
dard police practice. 61 Criminal suspects enjoyed little protection
Escobedo v. Illinois decision recognized a suspect's right to have an attorney present during
the interrogation, 378 U.S. at 490-91, many courts debated about the scope of its meaning.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966). Some lower courts applied the Escobedo
holding broadly to reverse convictions resulting from statements made in the absence of an
attorney during interrogation. See BAKER, supra note 3, at 50. Others restricted the Escobedo
decision on its facts and only applied it if the suspect specifically requested an attorney and
the police refused to accommodate him or her. See id. Recognizing the controversy of the
Escobedo decision, the Warren Court granted certiorari to Ernesto Miranda in order to resolve
some of the issues that remained unclear after Escobedo. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440-42.
' 9 Miranda, 384 U.S at 445.
bc' See id.
See BAKER, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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from police overreaching and were often subjected to physical bru-
tality or psychological coercion."' Miranda, however, put an end to
such practices by redefining the procedures that police must follow
when conducting interrogations.
In its 1966 landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the problems inherent in the
confession cases."' The Miranda Court held that the interrogators'
failure to read a suspect his or her rights prior to the interrogation
would render that confession inadmissible as involuntary given the
presumptively coercive setting of the custodial interrogation." Spe-
cifically, the Court stated that all criminal suspects have the right to
remain silent, the right to know that anything they say may be used
in a court of law, the right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation, and if they are indigent, the right to have an attorney
provided by the court."' In reaching its decision, the Court de-
scribed a variety of incidents of police abuse ranging from severe
beatings to subtle forms of psychological deception!'" In recognizing
the occurrence of these undesirable practices, the Court indicated
that custodial interrogation creates a presumption of coercion,
thereby affecting the admissibility of any statement made by the
suspect."' The Court reasoned that apprising a suspect of his or her
" 2 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S, 199 (1960) (Court found that psychological
overhearing, like physical brutality, could also render a confession involuntary); Sparro v.
New York, 360 U.S 315 (1959) (police violated due process by interrogating a foreign born
defendant For eight hours and denying him the right to contact his attorney); Chambers v,
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (Court found psychological coercion where police arrested
twenty-five to forty black men without warrants, interrogated them throughout the night
without giving them food or rest, and four of the suspects confessed); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936) (physical brutality used by the police rendered suspects' confessions
involuntary because the police activity constituted conduct "offensive" to a sense of justice).
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court noted that police often use mental trickery such as the
Mutt-and-Jeff act to elicit confessions from suspects. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452. The Mutt-
and-Jeff act involves one officer who plays the "heavy" and threatens the suspect in order to
scare a confession out of him while another friendly officer gains the suspect's confidence
by telling him that he will try to keep the "heavy" officer under control. Id. This friendly
treatment, following a harsh treatment by the other officer, often triggers a favorable re-
sponse from a suspect and facilitates the process of obtaining confessions, Id,
384 .U.S. at 455-56 & n.24. The Miranda decision, a product of the Warren Court,
follows from a line of cases decided by that Court which have recognized the rights of
criminal defendants. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, on remand, 153 So. 2d
299 (1963) (Warren Court allowed indigent defendants the right to assistance of counsel);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (Warren Court granted right to assistance of counsel
to defendants in custody),
"4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
"5 Id. at 467-69,472-73.
"" Id. at 445-46,450-58.
"7 Id. at 457-58.
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rights as outlined in the warnings would provide an appropriate
check on potential police coercion."
The Miranda Court addressed the admissibility of confessions
in four cases: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v.
United States, and California v. Stewart. In. reaching a decision, the
Court indicated that it would not focus on the specific facts of each
case, but instead, on the recurring problems caused by the system's
failure to protect the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial interrogations. 69
 The Court first addressed the problems
inherent in custodial interrogations and created its framework re-
quiring the warnings and an explicit waiver for a confession's ad-
missibility, and then applied this opinion to the facts of each case."
The Court held in Miranda, the lead case, that the interrogators'
failure to inform the accused of his rights to remain silent and to
have an attorney present during the interrogation rendered the
subsequent confession inadmissible. 71
 The Court further applied its
opinion to the other cases, finding that the interrogating officers'
failure to read suspects their rights prior to the interrogation in-
validated the confessions subsequently obtained . 72
The Miranda Court focused primarily on the inherent coercion
of custodial interrogations." The Court noted that police officers
often isolated criminal suspects from the public when conducting
interrogations, and therefore, the Court reasoned, the suspect re-
ceived virtually no protection From police overreaching. 74 The
Court stated that a number of variables enhanced the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogations, such as isolation, the police
dominated atmosphere, and the conduct of the officers controlling
fig Id. at 467.
" Id. at 491.
" Id. at 491-99.
71 Id. at 491-93.
72 Id. at 491-99. The Court held in Vignera v. New York that the interrogators' failure to
read the defendant his rights rendered his subsequent confession invalid because he had no
opportunity to exercise his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Id. at 494. In Westover v. United States, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction because
the local police never read the defendant his rights before interrogating him. Id. at 496. The
F.B.I. agents did read the suspect his rights, but the Court noted that, for all intents and
purposes, the suspect had not known his rights at the beginning of the interrogation process,
arid therefore, he could not possibly have waived his rights intelligently. Id. Finally, in
California v. Stewart, the Court affirmed the lower court's reversal of the defendant's convic-
tion due to the interrogators' failure to properly apprise the defendant of his rights before
conducting the questioning. Id. at 498-99.
73
	 id. at 444-45.
74 Id. at 455-58.
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the interrogations. 75
 In light of these variables, the Court stressed
the need to protect the accused's right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination.?"
In order to protect a suspect's fifth amendment rights, the
Miranda Court outlined a framework which police officers should
follow prior to conducting an interrogation. 77 The Court noted that
these guidelines require that a .suspect be advised of his or her
rights prior to the questioning. 78 In advocating the need to protect
the constitutional rights of an accused, while not unduly hampering
the abilities of law enforcement officers to effectively combat crime,
the Court claimed that it had created a framework that could serve
the former interests while not completely interfering with the lat-
ter.'"
Because of the isolated setting of the interrogation, the Miranda
Court ruled that a criminal defendant's fifth amendment right could
be protected best if the defendant were entitled to have an attorney
present during the questioning." In the Court's opinion, the attor-
ney's presence would vitiate the 'inherently coercive nature of the
interrogation by destroying the element of isolation, effectively uti-
lized by law enforcement officers prior to Miranda, and enhancing
the trustworthiness of the interrogators' actions.' The Court indi-
cated that a suspect's attorney would serve as an important check
on the interrogators' coercive power by counselling his client on the
legal implications of rendering a statement." Additionally, the Mi-
randa Court noted that the suspect's attorney would be a witness to
potential police overreaching throughout the interrogation pro-
cess."
To further this policy, the Court, in Miranda, ruled that criminal
suspects must be advised of their rights prior to an interrogation. 84
75 Id, at 449-56,
7" See id. at 460-61,
77 See id. at 467-73.
U. at 467.
79 Id. at 481.
Id. at 470.
8 I Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 467-74. These rules involve the reading of the famous Miranda warnings by the
police which advise a suspect of:
(a)The right to remain silent.
(b)Anything the suspect may say can be used against him in a court of law.
(c)The right to have an attorney present during interrogation.
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The Court outlined warnings that police would be required to give
suspects, including the right to remain silent, and the subsequent
instruction that anything that is said can and will be used against
the suspect in a court of law." The Court stated that the suspect
also must be advised that he or she has the right to an attorney and,
if he or she cannot afford an attorney, the right to have an attorney
appointed by the court. 86 Under this framework, the Court ob-
served, a suspect would receive valuable information concerning his
or her rights, thus facilitating a choice whether to exercise them
prior to a custodial interrogation to protect the fifth amendment
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 87
The Court then addressed the appropriate procedures if sus-
pects exercise their rights to remain silent and to speak to an attor-
ney. According to the Court, the "interrogation must cease" if the
suspect has exercised the right to remain silent. 88 If the suspect has
invoked the right to have an attorney present, the Court mandated
that "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 89
In the Court's opinion, these procedures provide the appropriate
safeguards to protect a suspect's fifth amendment rights. 90
The Court's ruling in Miranda, however, did not completely
undercut the police officers' use of confessions. In recognizing the
utility of confessions and society's interest in effective law enforce-
ment, the Court indicated that the criminal suspect could waive his
or her rights and thus, police could obtain an admissible confes-
sion.9 ' In order for a confession to be admissible against a criminal
defendant, the Court stated, the fifth amendment required that the
suspect's express waiver of either or both the rights to remain silent
and to have an attorney present during the interrogation precede
the suspect's statement or confession. The Court, however, indi-
cated that such a waiver would be subject to very stringent stan-
(d)The right to have an attorney appointed by the court if the suspect can not afford
one.
Id.
In addition, the Court, in Miranda, required that police must terminate an interrogation
if a suspect wishes to remain silent. If the police fail to terminate the interrogation, the Court
stated that any statement obtained in the interrogation will be presumed to have been the
product of compulsion. Id. at 473-74.
88 Id. at 468-69.
86 !d. at 471-72.
" 7 Id. at 473-74.
m Id.
B9 Id. at 474.
9" Id. at 477.
9 ' Id. at 478.
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dards.'2 The Court held that an interrogation conducted in the
absence of an attorney saddled the government with a "heavy bur-
den" of demonstrating that the suspect made the waiver knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. Because the suspect's Miranda rights
safeguard his or her fifth amendment guarantees, the Court em-
phasized that the suspect's waiver of those rights must be clear."
The Court indicated that a waiver, implied from a suspect's silence
following the issuance of the Miranda warnings, would not be suf-
ficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Thus, the Miranda
Court did not discard completely the use of interrogations by police
to elicit confessions. Instead, it held that such confessions were
admissible if they were preceded by both warnings of the suspect's
constitutional rights and the suspect's express, knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of such rights."
In dissenting opinions, Justices Clark, Stewart, Harlan, and
White objected to the sweeping changes the majority imposed on
the police. Justice Clark argued that the totality of' the circumstances
test, which courts had applied prior to Miranda, provided the best
alternative for judicial analysis, given its flexibility." Justice White
indicated that the majority's bright-line rules created a less flexible
framework that would interfere unduly with the ability of the police
to engage effectively in the investigative process.` 17 Justice Harlan,
advocating for the totality of the circumstances approach, stressed
that this approach appropriately weighed the competing interests
between society's need for effective law enforcement and the rights
of the accused in the interrogation process." Despite these objec-
tions, the Miranda majority concluded that, rather than a flexible
standard, bright-line rules were needed to combat police overreach-
ing.'}
In sum, the Miranda decision laid down bright-line rules af-
fecting the admissibility of confessions obtained during the inter-
rogation process. The Court based the admissibility of confessions
on police officers reading a suspect his or her rights prior to the
interrogation, and the suspect's express waiver of the right to re-
"2 Id. at 475-76.
91 Id.
94 Id.
" Id. at 476-78.
"' Id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"7 Id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting).
"" Id, at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 468-69.
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main silent and/or the right to an attorney prior to the making of
a statement. In the event that the interrogating officers failed to
issue the required warnings, or the suspect failed to knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his or her rights, the Court held
that confessions would be inadmissible given the presumptively
coercive nature of the police interrogation. By imposing the waiver
requirement, the Court did not totally reject the pre-Miranda totality
of the circumstances test that had been used previously in confession
cases. Instead, the Court restricted the test's applicability to a de-
termination of the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of a
suspect's waiver. Although several dissenting Justices objected to the
sweeping changes imposed by the Court, favoring the continued
use of the totality of the circumstances test, the Court concluded
that bright-line rules were needed to prevent police coercion.
C. Subsequent Developments Relating to the Waiver Requirement
Following the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court began to
limit the application of its ruling in a series of cases dealing with
the waiver requirement. These cases involved both a suspect's
waiver of the right to remain silent,'"° and the waiver of the right
to an attorney.'"' In addition, the Court addressed the differences
between express and implied waivers, recognizing the validity of
the latter despite Miranda's holding. 1 °2 The Court also examined
whether the requirement that a suspect knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive these rights burdened the police to fully disclose
information that was not readily available to that suspect at the time
of the waiver.'" 3 In addressing the waiver requirement, the Court
subsequently recognized the validity of many waivers that did not
accommodate Miranda's heightened standards.
The Court first began to expand its definition of waiver, thereby
restricting Miranda's scope, in the 1975 decision of Michigan v. Mos-
ley.' 04 The Mosley Court held that a second interrogation, resulting
"See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Court upheld confession resulting from
a second interrogation following the suspect's request to remain silent).
1 ' See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (juvenile suspect's request for a probation
officer held to he a waiver of the right to have an attorney present (luring his interrogation).
"2 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (Court recognized the validity of
implied waivers of the Miranda rights based on the suspect's actions preceding the interro-
gation).
16' See Moran v, Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (Court held that a suspect's decision to
waive his or her rights does not hinge on the suspect's knowledge that an attorney already
has been provided).
I" 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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in a confession, which followed a suspect's initial choice to remain
silent is not per se invalid as a violation of the fifth amend ment.i° 5
The Mosley Court hinged the admissibility of the suspect's confession
on the fact that the police "scrupulously honored" the suspect's
right to terminate the initial questioning.' 0ti In addition, the Court
focused on the length of time between the interrogations, the use
of different officers in each interrogation, and the different focus
of the questions throughout the second interrogation. 167 Thus, the
Mosley Court, moving away from a bright-line rule, took the partic-
ular facts of the case into account in finding that the second inter-
rogation did not violate the Miranda waiver requirements.
The Court further restricted Miranda in its 1979 decision of
North Carolina v. Butler, holding that the suspect may impliedly waive
his or her right to an attorney."' In Butler, the police provided the
defendant with an "Advice of Rights" form which, in accordance
with Miranda, informed him of' his constitutional rights prior to
interrogation.'" The defendant acknowledged to the police that he
understood his rights but refused to sign the waiver at the bottom
of the form.H" The defendant indicated, however, that he would
103 Id. at 102-03. In dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall objected to the majority's
departure from Miranda. Id. at 112 (Brennan, J., dissenting). They argued that Miranda
established rules to prevent a suspect's will from being overborne by the compelling atmo-
sphere during the interrogation. Id. They noted that the second interrogation conducted by
the police, following a suspect's lengthy periodpf detention, sufficiently compelled the suspect
to make a statement.. Id. at 115 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although noting that Miranda
should not be construed to impose a restriction on the resumption of questioning, Brennan
and Marshall contend that the questioning should be resumed only if the suspect has an
attorney present in order to dissipate the compelling atmosphere and protect the suspect's
constitutional rights. /d. at 115-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Titus, according to Brennan
and Marshall, the presumption of compulsion created by the Miranda rules rendered the
suspect's statements during the second interrogation inadmissible as a product of the inter-
rogation's compelling atmosphere.
"'Id, at 104.
107 id.
1 "" 44 I U.S. 369,373 (1979). In dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens objected
to the it willingness to imply a waiver from the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. Id, at 377-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Relying on the Miranda decision, the
dissent argued that rite suspect's waiver of the right to an attorney must he specifically made.
Id, at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By using a totality approach that draws on inferences to
imply a waiver, the dissent argued that the Court had departed from the Miranda requiretnent
that an ambiguous waiver be interpreted against the prosecution. Id. at 377-78 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent asserted that only an affirmative waiver of the right to an
attorney could adequately satisfy the Miranda waiver requirement and protect a suspect's
fifth amendment rights. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
/d. at 370-7].
11 " Id, at 371.
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speak to the police." At no time did the defendant either request
an attorney or explicitly waive his right to have an attorney present
during the interrogation." 2
Although acknowledging Miranda's requirement that the waiver
be explicit, the Butler Court refused to interpret Miranda's language
as a bar to all confessions obtained in the absence of explicit waiv-
ers." 3 The Court recognized the need for an explicit waiver as
"strong proof" of the confession's validity, but further indicated
that valid waivers can be implied under circumstances where the
suspect's actions and words clearly support that conclusion."' As a
result, the Court remanded the case, suggesting that the lower court
determine whether the defendant in fact understood his rights and
impliedly waived them when he participated in the interrogation." 3
Similarly, the Court has held that a suspect's request for an
individual other than an attorney, followed by a confession, may be
sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of the right to have an
attorney present during interrogation." 6 In the 1979 decision of
Fare v. Michael C. , the Court held that a juvenile's request for his
probation officer constituted an implied waiver of his right to have
an attorney present." 7 In so holding, the Court rejected the notion
that the request invoked the fifth amendment right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination."B Because the juvenile failed to ex-
ercise his Miranda rights by requesting a probation officer rather
than an attorney, the Court reasoned that he had failed to invoke
his fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimi-
1 " Id.
112 Id.
" 3 Id. at 373.
114 ,rd
II) Id. at 374-76.
" 6 See Fare v. Michael G., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
" 7 Id. at 726. In dissent, Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stevens rejected the majority's
limitation of Miranda to the right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. Id.
at 731-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent construed Miranda as requiring a juvenile's
request to see a probation officer as an assertion of his fifth amendment right to counsel. Id.
at 730 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Given the fact that the suspect was a youth, the dissent
recognized the relationship between juveniles and probation officers and argued that the
latter were "well-suited" to assist juveniles in matters relating to the right to have an attorney
present. Id. at 730-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, recognizing the importance of a
probation officer to a juvenile, the dissent held that the suspect's request for his probation
officer was a per se invocation of his fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination. Id.
"8 Id. at 727-28.
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nation, and therefore, his subsequent statement could be used
against him. 1 '`'
In contrast with the trend towards narrowing Miranda, the
Court, in the 1981 decision of Edwards v. Arizona, adhered to Mi-
randa in holding that a suspect's request. for an attorney during an
initial interrogation invalidated a waiver rendered in a subsequent
interrogation because the suspect did not initiate further commu-
nications with the police following the termination of the first in-
terrogation.' t 0 In Edwards, the suspect gave a taped statement to
the police, asserting an alibi defense. 12 ' The suspect then informed
the interrogators that. he wanted to make a deal, but requested that
his attorney be present. before conducting negotiations with them. 122
The next morning, the detectives told Edwards that he had to talk
to them, despite his desire to remain silent. 12" Edwards cooperated,
but stated that he didn't want: any of his 'statements on tape.' 24
The Edwards Court held that the officers' actions violated the
Miranda requirements because the interrogators continued the in-
terrogation after the defendant clearly invoked his right to COUli ,
se1. 125 In so ruling, the Court cited Miranda's clear language prohib-
iting interrogators from continuing an interrogation if the suspect
has requested an attorney.t 2" The Court emphasized that, once the
suspect requested an attorney, any statement obtained by the police
from the suspect would be inadmissible unless the subsequent com-
munication satisfied two standards.' 27 First, the Court held that the
statement must have been the product of a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver. 128 Second, the communication with the police
must. have been initiated by the suspect. 129 Otherwise, the Court
held, any statement that the suspect made would be inadmissible.'"
119 m,
Edwards v, Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981),
12 ' Id. at 479.
122 1d.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id, at 485,
121 'Id. at'482 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 43h, 474 (196(i)). The Miranda Court
clearly expressed the procedures that interrogators must follow when a suspect requests :in
attorney. The Court held that "tilf the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
127 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.
1291d .
' 29 1d. at 484-85.
1911 Id.
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Other post -Miranda cases involve the Court's determination of
the kind of information that the suspect. needs before he or she
waives his or her Miranda rights. For example, in the 1986 Supreme
Court decision of Moran v. Burbine, the Court held that the inter-
rogating officer's failure to inform a suspect that his sister had
obtained an attorney for him did not invalidate the suspect's waiver
of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation."' The
Court found that the police's failure to inform the defendant that
he had an attorney waiting did not relate to his ability to waive his
rights and make a statement. L 3  Although this information may have
affected the defendant's decision, the Court stated that the Consti-
tution does not require interrogating officers to apprise suspects of
all relevant information that may be useful in the suspect's decision
to waive his or her rights and make statements. 1 The Court. rec-
ognized, however, that a rule requiring officers to apprise defen-
dants of all the facts relevant to their waiver decision might add
" marginally to Miranda's goal of dispelling the compulsion inherent
in custodial interrogation."'" But, the Court stated that such an
approach would only cloud Miranda's application by straying froth
its initial mandate to protect suspects from coercion to requiring
officers to know whether a particular defendant has an attorney."'
Thus, the Court held that a suspect's knowledge that an attorney
has been provided for him or her is not essential to the suspect's
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to an attor-
ney.' 31'
1 ' 1 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 4 12,423-24 (1986). In a strongly worded dissent. Justices
Stevens, Marshall and Brennan objected to the majority's decision that the police need not
inform a suspect that an attorney actually has been provided prior to the suspect's decision
to waive that right to an attorney. Id. at 450-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting
Justices noted that the officers' failure to inform the suspect that an attorney was present
constituted deception that vitiated the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver rendered
by the suspect. Id. at 453-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent rejected the
majority's analysis that requiring police to inform suspects that attorneys had been provided
would undermine the clarity of Miranda. Id. at 460-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, the
dissent noted that Miranda required that a suspect's waiver be knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily given, and because knowledge that an attorney has been provided provides the
suspect with full information in order to decide whether to waive his or her fifth amendment
rights, such knowledge is essential to the validity of a suspect's waiver. See id. at 454-56
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent argued that the suspect's waiver of the right to an
attorney was invalid, and his subsequent statements were inadmissible.
I " Id. at 422-23.
'" Id, at 422.
I " Id. at 425.
" 5 Id. at 425-26.
' 3'i Id. at 423-24.
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In sum, the Supreme Court has narrowed Miranda's scope by
analyzing the circumstances surrounding the particular defendant's
actions when determining whether the defendant waived his or her
rights. A suspect's request for individuals other than attorneys,
followed by a voluntary statement, sufficiently creates the inference
that the suspect has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her
right to an attorney. In addition, confessions obtained during a
second interrogation following the suspect's request to remain silent
will be admissible as long as the police "scrupulously honored" the
suspect's right to terminate the first interrogation. When a suspect
invokes the right to have an attorney present. during the interro-
gation, the Court has held that a waiver of these rights will be
upheld only if the suspect initiates subsequent communications with
the police, and that the waiver has been knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily rendered. Finally, the Court has held that a suspect's
knowledge that an attorney has been provided for him or her is
not a necessary prerequisite for a suspect's knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of the right to an attorney. Thus, subsequent to
Miranda, the Supreme Court limited the decision's scope by broadly
interpreting a defendant's actions as waiving his or her Miranda
rights.
D. New Cases Under the Rehnquist Court
During 1986 and 1987, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided three cases that concentrated on the knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary components of Miranda's waiver requirement in further
limiting Miranda's scope. In the 1986 decision of Colorado v. Connelly,
the Court recognized as voluntary a mentally incompetent individ-
ual's waiver of his Miranda rights because the Court found no
evidence of police coercion, notwithstanding evidence supporting a
finding that the suspect's mental illness compelled his confession.'"
In addition, the Court decided Connecticut v. Barrett, in which it held
that a suspect's request for an attorney solely for the purpose of
making a written statement did not demonstrate that the suspect
failed to comprehend the consequences of the limited invocation of
the right to counsel so as to bar the prosecution from introducing
into evidence the oral statements voluntarily made by the suspect
during the interrogation.' 38 Finally, in Colorado v. Spring, the Court
I" Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523—'14 (1986).
Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S,Ct.. 828, 832 (1987).
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held that the police need not inform a suspect of the specific charges
that he or she is being questioned about in order to support a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the suspect's fifth
amendment rights."'' These cases, decided under Chief justice
Rehnquist's leadership, further limit Miranda's. bright-line approach
to the admissibility of confessions.
In Colorado v. Connelly, the Court held that police coercion is a
necessary prerequisite for finding that a suspect has not voluntarily
waived the Miranda rights.'`"' In Connelly, the defendant approached
a police officer and told him that he wanted to confess to a mur-
der."' After the officer carefully read him his rights a number of
times, the defendant waived these rights. The police officer then
placed the defendant in custody and brought him to the station for
interrogation: 42 Following a period of interrogation, the police dis-
covered that the defendant was mentally incompetent: 48 The de-
fendant claimed that he confessed because God's voice told him to
confess: 44
The defendant moved to suppress his statements at a prelimi-
nary hearing.'' At this hearing, the examining psychiatrist testified,
in his expert opinion, that the defendant suffered from chronic
schizophrenia and had been in this state when he waived his rights
and confessed.' 46 In addition, the psychiatrist testified that the na-
ture of the defendant's hallucinations significantly impaired his abil-
ity to act voluntarily: 47 The trial court, relying on this evidence,
suppressed the defendant's statements because they were not the
product of a voluntary decision: 48
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision.' 49 In so ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the proper test for the admissibility of a defendant's confession
is whether the statements were "the product of a rational intellect
j39
 Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851, 859 (1987).
"'Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 523-24.
" I Id. at 518.
142
"3 Id. at 519.
144 Id .
145 Id.
146
147 id.
"8 1d.
"9 Id. (citing People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985)).
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and a free will." 150 The Colorado Supreme Court determined that
the defendant's mental instability invalidated his waiver of rights.I 51
In Connelly, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado Supreme Court, holding that the defendant's waiver was
valid as a voluntary waiver. Furthermore, the Court held that Mi-
randa did not require the suppression of the defendant's state-
ments. 152
 The Connelly Court interpreted the Miranda decision as
requiring governmental coercion in order for a confession to be
considered involuntary and rendered inadmissible.' 53 Because the
police in Connelly did not coerce the defendant into making a state-
ment or waiving his rights, the Court held that the defendant vol-
untarily waived his rights.trt
The Court, in Connelly, rejected the defendant's claim that his
mental incompetence rendered his waiver invalid.' 55 Notions of
"free will," the Court stated, are irrelevant to a judicial determina-
tion of the voluntariness of the suspect's statements)'" The Court
instead focused on governmental coercion as a necessary prereq-
' 5° See Connelly, 702 P.2d at 728.
,5, Id. at 729.
152 Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 524. Dissenting in part, justice Stevens stated that the police
officers had no duty to read the defendant his rights when he initially approached them to
confess. Id. at 525 (Stevens, j., dissenting). According to justice Stevens, once the police
decided to bring the suspect to the station, they assumed a different relationship with him
and then were required to read hint his rights. See id. justice Stevens reasoned that given
the defendant's mental condition, his waiver was invalid mid involuntary. Id. Thus, justice
Stevens conclutled that absent the defendant's valid waiver of the right to remain silent and
the right to an attorney, his statements were inadmissible. Id.
In addition, Justices Brennan am! Marshall vigorously dissented. They claimed that
governmental coercion is nut the only factor sufficient to render a confession inadmissible
when dealing with a mentally ill individual. Id. at 526 (Brennan, j., dissenting). justices
Brennan and Marshall cited a line of cases dealing with "voluntary" confessions and argued
that the Court's rejection of "free will" is inconsistent with the Court's analysis of confessions
in its earlier decisions. Id, at 529 (Brennan, j., dissenting). Because the defendant suffered
front a mental disorder, Brennan and Marshall reasoned, the reliability of his confession was
in serious doubt. See id. at 530-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan and Marshall also objected to the Court's standard for determining waiver. Id.
at 531 (Brennan, j., dissenting). Citing Miranda, they claimed that the standard required by
that decision placed a "heavy burden" on the prosecutor to demonstrate that a suspect waived
his or her rights. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966)). Thus, Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the Court's use of a preponderance of
evidence standard because, by reducing the prosecution's burden of proof, it contravened
Pilirunda by making it easier to prove that a waiver had been given by the suspect. Id.
L" Id. at 522.
15' Id. at 524.
' 5 ' Id.
' 55 /d. at 523.
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uisite for a determination of involuntariness. 157 The Court thus
remanded the case to the Colorado Supreme Court for proceedings
consistent with its interpretation of voluntary. 158
In addition to addressing the voluntariness issue, the Court also
examined the appropriate evidentiary standards for proving a
waiver in accordance with Miranda. The Connelly Court held that.
the prosecutor need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant waived his rights under Miranda.' 59 In
applying this standard, the Court noted the interests of society in
effective law enforcement and observed that a more stringent stan-
dard for prosecutors may result in the suppression of probative
evidence that goes directly to the truth of the matter. Thus, by
applying the least restrictive standard, the Connelly Court sought to
facilitate the admissibility of confessions based on knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary waivers. 16°
Similarly, one month later in Connecticut v. Barrett, the Court
held that a suspect's request to have an attorney present while
making a written statement did not render inadmissible oral state-
ments that the defendant made in the attorney's absence, because
the request failed to reflect the suspect's lack of understanding
regarding the consequences of the limited invocation of the right
to counsel. 161 In Barrett, the police arrested the defendant for sexual
crimes. 1 "2 The defendant agreed to talk to the police, admitting his
guilt in the crimes, but he refused to make a written statement
without having an attorney present. 163 At trial, the prosecutor used
the oral statements against the defendant as evidence of his guilt. 164
In admitting the statements, the trial court concluded that the de-
fendant understood his Miranda rights and that his request to have
an attorney present for the written statements constituted a waiver
of the defendant's right to an attorney during the oral admissions. 165
157
1 " Id. at 524. In remanding the case, the Court acknowledged that the Colorado Supreme
Court may have invalidated the defendant's waiver Oil grounds other than voluntariness. Id,
at 524 n.4. As a result, the Court noted that the Colorado Supreme Court was free to
reconsider other issues (such as the knowing or intelligent requirements) if it chose to
nonetheless exclude the defendant's confession. Id.
159 1d, at 523.
'6u Id. at 522-23.
' 6 ' Connecticut. v. Barrett, l07 S. Ct. 828, 832 (1987).
162
 Id. at 830.
16' Id.
'"4 Id. at 830-31,
165 Id.
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On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the de-
fendant's convictioniG6 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that
the defendant's request to have an attorney present before making
a written statement was sufficient to invoke the right to counse1. 167
As a result, the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned, the defen-
dant's waiver could only be valid if he initiated further discussions
with the police, and he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived the right to counsel in accordance with Edwards v. Arizona.' 68
Because the defendant failed to initiate further communication with
the police, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the de-
fendant's statements were improperly admitted as evidence.' 69
The United States Supreme Court reversed, admitting the oral
confession into evidence.'" The Barrett Court distinguished Edwards
in concluding that the defendant waived his right to have an attor-
ney present for his oral admissions when he qualified that right by
stating that he would not make a written statement in his attorney's
absence."' The Court noted that the defendant's statements were
clear and that the police acted on the defendant's wishes."' The
Court further observed that the defendant's limited invocation of
the right to counsel failed to reflect an incomplete understanding
of the consequences so as to "vitiate" the voluntariness of his confes-
sion.'" As a result, the Barrett Court concluded that the defendant's
oral statements were admissible because he waived the right to have
his attorney present when he made them to the police.'" Thus, the
""' See State v. Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044 (1985).
'"7 id. at 57, 495 A.2d at 1049 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 45l U.S. 477, 479, 484-85
(1981)).
"s Id. at 58.
'''" Id. at 58-60.
17" Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828, 833 (1987).
" I
 Id. at 832.
'2 Id.
17 ' Id. at 832-33.
174 Id. at 832. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the result but not
the majority's legal reasoning. Brennan, applying Miranda, claimed that the state satisfied
Miranda's heavy burden of demonstrating. that the defendant waived his right to remain
silent during his oral admissions. Id. at 834-35 (Brennan, J., concurring). The defendant, in
Brennan's opinion, understood his rights and clearly limited his exercise of these rights to
the making of a written statement. Id. at 835 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan argued,
however, that an affirmative waiver still served as the best means of determining whether a
particular suspect has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights. Id.
at 833 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan reasoned that, given the specific facts and circum-
stances, the defendant's actions and statements requesting an attorney prior to making a
written statement effectuated an affirmative waiver of the right to have an attorney present
for the oral communications. Id. at 833-34 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, Brennan agreed,
the defendant's oral statements were properly admitted into evidence at trial.
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Court remanded the case to the Connecticut Supreme Court in
light of its ruling on the validity of the defendant's limited waiver.'"
In 1987, the Court further restricted Miranda's application in
Colorado v. Spring.' 76 The Spring Court held that a suspect's knowl-
edge of the specific charges that he or,she is being interrogated on
is not relevant to determine whether that suspect rendered a valid
waiver of his or her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination)" In Spring, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) arrested the defendant for his involvement in the
interstate shipment of stolen firearms)" Prior to questioning,, they
informed him of his Miranda rights.'" The defendant claimed that
he understood his rights and was willing to make a statement and
to answer questions.'"
,During the interrogation, the ATF agents questioned the de-
fendant about his involvement in an unrelated murder) 8 ' The de-
fendant indicated that he had "shot another guy once," but denied
involvement in the murder.' 82 Two months later, Colorado officials
questioned the defendant about the murder.'" The defendant co-
operated with the officials and rendered a confession that was later
used against hiin in court.'"
On appeal, the defendant contended that his statements re-
garding the second crime were inadmissible because he never re-
ceived Miranda warnings prior to his interrogation about the second
crime.I 85 The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the
officers shOuld have read the defendant his rights before each
•
interrogation, rather than read the defendant his rights once, be-
fore asking the defendant questions about both incidents.'" The
Colorado Court of Appeals thus held that all of the defendant's
statements relating to the murder were inadmissible.' 87
' 75 Id. at 833.
16 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
'" Id. at 859.
' 75 Id. at 853.
'" Id. at 853-54.
,"" Id. at 854.
181 Id.
' 87 Id.
1 "
1114 Id.
1 " Id. at 855.
' 56 See People v. Spring, 671 P.2d 965, 966 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
187 Id. at 967.
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The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals
decision but on different grounds.'" Applying a totality of the
circumstances approach, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
suspect's knowledge of the charges that he or she is being ques-
tioned about can be a determinative factor in evaluating the sus-
pect's waiver.' 8" As a result, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded
that, under the circumstances, the defendant could not possibly
have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
remain silent and his right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation because he did not realize that the police were going
to question him about a second crime.'"°
The United States Supreme Court, in Colorado v. Spring, re-
versed the Colorado Supreme Court, holding that when the police
properly read the defendant his Miranda rights, he was on notice
that _anything that he might say could be used against him in
court.'"' The COurt further stated that the police need not inform
a suspect of all relevant circumstances prior to a suspect's decision
to waive his or. her fifth amendment rights.'" 2 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the interrbgators', failure to inform a suspect that
the interrogation would 'encompass additional criminal matters did
not invalidate the suspect's, waiver of the fifth amendment privilege
against .
The Spring Coili-t ;applied a totality of the circumstances ap-
prdaeh,. and found that the defendant understood and knowingly,
intelligently, and vokintarily waived his Miranda rights. 1 "4 Because
1 " See Veope V. Spring, 713 I'.2d 865 (Colo. 1985).
P99 frl. at 872-73.
Id. at 874.
' 91 Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Gt, 851, 859 (1987). In dissent, Justices Brennan and
Marshall stated that information relating to the particular crimes that a suspect is being
interrogated about is relevant to his or her decision to waive fifth amendment rights. Id. at
860 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent argued that a requirement that police
inform suspects of the subjects that will be discussed in interrogation would not interfere
unduly with legitimate interrogation techniques. Id. In fact, the dissent noted that such a
requirement may ensure that an arrest was lawfully made and that the suspect's statement
was not the product of compulsion. Id. The dissent contended that the absence of such
relevant information undermined the validity of defendant's waiver. Id, at 861-62 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Thus, according to Brennan and Marshall, the defendant's waiver of his rights
to remain silent and to have an attorney present during the interrogation relating to the
murder charge was involuntary and, as a result, defendant's statements relating to the second
charge were inadmissible. Id.
' 99 Id, (citing Moran v, Burbine,475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)).
199 Id.
194 Id. at 857.
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the defendant understood his rights and could have realized the
consequences of speaking freely with the interrogating officers, the
Court held that the defendant's waiver was valid. 195
 Thus, the Court
concluded that the defendant's statements relating to his involve-
ment in the murder were admissible against him. The Court, there-
fore, remanded the case for a proper determination consistent with
its opinion. 196
In sum, the Rehnquist Court further limited Miranda's scope
through its analysis of the defendant's waiver of his or her Miranda
rights. Recently, the Court held that a mentally incompetent indi-
vidual's waiver of his fifth amendment rights was voluntary because
there was no evidence that governmental coercion influenced the
suspect's decision to waive his rights. In addition, the Court held
that the prosecution need only demonstrate the defendant's waiver
of his or her rights by a preponderance of the evidence. In other
decisions, the Court ruled that the defendant's request to have an
attorney present when making a written statement, resulting in a
waiver of the defendant's right to have an attorney present during
oral communications, did not manifest an insufficient understand-
ing of the consequences of the limited invocation of the right to
counsel so as to invalidate the waiver. Finally, the Court ruled that
a suspect did not need to know the charges that he was being
questioned about in order to render a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his fifth amendment rights.
II. EROSION OF MIRANDA: A RETURN TO THE VOLUNTARINESS
STANDARD
Over the years, Miranda v. Arizona has been the subject of much
debate, 197
 and has been attacked recently by prominent conserva-
tives as impeding the efficacy of the criminal justice system.' 98
 In
193 1d. at 857-58.
1 96
 Id. at 859.
1 g 7 See Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 405-06. John C. Bell, former Chief Judge of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, often criticized United States Supreme Court decisions, such
as Miranda, as decisions that would "shackle the police and virtually tie the hands of district
attorneys and trial judges and appellate court judges." BAKER, supra note 3, at 183 (quoting
Bell). At a time when crime rates seem staggering, Miranda stands out as one of the key
obstacles to the effective administration of criminal justice in the eyes of certain politicians,
judges, lawyers, and members of the public. See Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 405-06,406
n.7; see also BAKER, supra note 3, at 182-86,204-05.
19" See Agronsky, Meese v. Miranda: The Final Countdown, 73 A.B.A. J. 86-92 (November
1, 1987). In recent years, one of Miranda's harshest critics has been Reagan's Attorney General
Edwin Meese who views Miranda as a decision that shields criminals from effective prose-
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tracing Miranda's developments, however, it is clear that the Su-
preme Court has already embarked on a course to restrict the
decision's scope.'`° This narrowing trend is best explained by the
shift in the composition of the Supreme Court from its once liberal
majority led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, to an increasingly con-
servative bloc under Chief Justice Warren Burger, and more re-
cently, Chief Justice William Rehnquist.""
An analysis of Miranda's treatment in the Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts requires an understanding of the judicial philos-
ophies that influenced the Court's decisions. The Warren Court
played an active role in protecting individuals' constitutional
rights. 2" 1 As a protector of individual rights, the Warren Court
rejected the Court's balancing of society's needs and interests against
individual rights. 202
 Instead, the Warren Court subscribed to a phi-
losophy that individual rights under the Constitution were absolute
and could not be abridged by society's interests. 2"' The Warren
Court's shift away from the totality of the circumstances test, which
accorded significant discretion to trial judges, and adoption of an
objective set of rules to protect the constitutional rights of criminal
suspects during periods of custodial interrogation, was both pre-
dictable and understandable. 2"4 :
The Miranda Court did not completely abolish the totality of
the circumstances test. Instead, the Court limited the test to a de-
termination of the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver.2°5
 The Court,
cution. hl. at 87. As Attorney General, Meese has directed the Justice Department to launch
an attack on the decision. See id.
Other noted critics, such as Philadelphia Police Commissioner Edward J. Bell, claimed
that the present rules and interpretations, whether or not so intended — in fact protect the
guilty. 1 do not believe the Constitution was designed as a shield for criminals." BARER, supra
note 3, at 176.
" 1" See supra notes 100-196 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limitations
placed on Miranda through a broad interpretation of a defendant's waiver.
21 ") See supra notes 23-24.
"I See Crossley, supra note !?3, at 1697-98. At a time when racism was widespread,
especially in the South, the Warren Court forcefully instituted a program of desegregation
and radically altered a school system. See Brown v. Board of Education; 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
In Brown, the Warren Court held that segregated facilities were inherently unequal. This
decision set the Supreme Court on a path which led to the desegregation of many school
systems throughout the nation within a 20-year period.
2"2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,479-81 (1966).
203 Id. at 479.
214 See id. at 468-69; and see supra text accompanying notes 77-95 for a discussion of the
bright-line rules imposed by the Wat ren Court, and the Court's approach to a suspect's
waiver of the rights protected by these rules.
2",
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76.
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however, sought to minimize. the subjective nature of this test by
listing criteria that would govern the determination of acceptable
waivers. 2" Thus, although Miranda ,attempted to replace the fac-
tually based totality of the circumstances test, the Burger and Rehn-
quist Courts have renewed successfully its application through a
broad analysis of the defendant's waiver of his or her rights. 207
In limiting Miranda, the Burger Court considered the interests
of society along with those of individuals. 20S Indeed, chief Justice
Burger never subscribed to a view that highly probative evidence
should be excluded even if it was obtained illegally. 209 As. one of
Miranda's harshest critics, Justice Burger criticized the effect of
exclusionary rules in commenting that it is wrong to "deter Peter
by punishing Paul." 21 ° This philosophy provides the underlying
theme of many Burger Court decisions and provides greater insight
into the Court's actions in its continued restriction of Miranda's
scope.
Similarly, the Rehnquist Court has continued to limit: the Mi-
randa decision's impact on criminal prosecutions. President Reagan's.-
appointments of known conservatives Antonin Scalia and Anthony
Kennedy perpetuates conservative control of the Supreme Court
for some years to come. The Court's predominant conservative
philosophy rejects Miranda's underlying rationale and harkens back
to the earlier critici sms hurled at the Miranda decision..
The Miranda bright-line rules created a presumption of coer-
cion that could only be defeated if the prosecutor successfully dem-
onstrated that a suspect was read his or her rights and fully under-
stood them, and that the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and
2°6 Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Miranda Court's
criteria for acceptable waivers and tkie elements qf ail inValid waiver.
207 See infra text accompanying notes 236-273 for a discussion of the Burger Court's
trend toward narrowing Miranda through a bioid heading of what constitutes a valid waiver.
298 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (Court upheld suspect's waiver of
the right to an attorney despite the fact that the police failed to inform. him that his sister
already had provided an attorney for him); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-
51 (1974). In Michigan v. Tucker, the Court held that the Miranda warnings are only prophy-
lactic rules that safeguard constitutional rights and thus concluded that they are not consti-
tutionally required. Id. at 443-44. The Tucker Court applied a balancing test to determine
the extent of the police's violation of the defendant's rights and stated that "when balancing
the interests involved, we must weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of
making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which
either party seeks to adduce." Id. at 450.
209 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 57.
21° See id. (quoting Burger, External Checks — The Views of a jurist, THE POLICE YEARBOOK
128 (1965)).
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voluntarily waived those rights.'" Although the central focus of the
criticism lies in the fact that Miranda imposed bright-line rules for
police behavior and moved away from a more flexible case-by-case
analysis of confessions,"'' the subsequent Burger Court decisions
demonstrate that the conservative block has returned to the pre-
Miranda case-by-case analysis. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court has
gone further, in Colorado v. Connelly, by creating the presumption
of voluntariness of a suspect's waiver in the absence of governmental
coercion. 213 Although the Rehnquist Court's limitations on Miranda's
scope, in cases such as Connecticut v. Barrett and Colorado v. Spring,
prevent criminal defendant's from escaping effective prosecution
by exploiting technicalities in Miranda's application, the Rehnquist
Court has gone too far in the Connelly case by creating presumptions
that virtually emasculate Miranda's constitutional safeguards. \
Section II analyzes the changing approach of the S1-1131.C?rie
Court in its treatment of the defendant's waiver. Subsection A ex-
amines Miranda's impact on criminal procedure and discusses the
importance of the decision given its timely relevance.'" Subsection
B focuses on the Burger Court's treatment of a defendant's waiver
and demonstrates how the Court narrowed Miranda by interpreting
broadly the elements of a valid waiver.'''' Subsection C examines
the cases decided by the Rehnquist Court to determine the future
course of Miranda in criminal procedural protections."'"
A. The Relevance of Miranda and its Effects on Police Behavior
Miranda was an important decision because it brought the Con-
stitution from the courtroom to police interrogation roorns. 217 The
Miranda Court mandated that police recognize the limits that con-
stitutional principles impose on the interrogation process. 218 The
Miranda decision reaffirmed the Court's previous application of the
fifth amendment to state criminal trials in Malloy, while rejecting its
earlier case-by-case approach applying the totality of the circum-
211 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 47546, 479 (1966).
212 See id. at 499-549 (19(16) (Clark, Stewart, Harlan and White, B., dissenting).
2 " See Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828
(1987); Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 . (1986); and see infra text accompanying notes
274-297 fur a discussion of the Rehnquist Court's treatment and limitation of Miranda.
214 See infra text accompanying notes 217-235.
215 See infra text accompanying notes 236-273.
216 See infra text accompanying notes 274-297,
21 ' See BAKER, supra. note 3, at 170-71.
218 See it at 171.
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stances analysis. 219 The Miranda Court created a framework that
simplified judicial analysis of police interrogation to determine
whether the interrogating officers violated a criminal suspect's fifth
amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 22°
Finally, the Miranda decision served to shape police procedure by
defining clear rules that officers need to follow when interrogating
a suspect.221
Miranda abolished the incommunicado setting of the interro-
gation rooms by mandating the presence of an attorney during
police questioning if the suspect so desired. 222 The attorney's pres-
ence during interrogation, the Court held, provided the best
safeguard223 of a suspect's fifth amendment right to "[not] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 224 Coun-
sel could then serve as a witness to police overreaching and, there-
fore, check the power of these officials as well as insure that the
interrogation does not violate constitutional principles. 225 In bring-
ing constitutional principles into the interrogation rooms, the Mi-
randa rule became synonymous with the fifth amendment right to
be free from self-incrimination. 226
2 ' 9 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1966) (relying on Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
22" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463-65 (1966).
221 Id. at 467-74. See supra note 84 for a discussion of Miranda's bright-line requirements
and the now famous Miranda warnings.
222 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
2" Id.
2" U.S. CoNs•r. amend. V. See supra note 34 for a text of the fifth amendment.
225 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
226 See Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 416. Earlier cases, such as lEscobedo a. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), dealt with a suspect's sixth amendment right "to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." U.S, CoNsT. amend. VI. Miranda did not rely on the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, but instead, recognized a suspect's right to have an attorney present
during a custodial interrogation in order to protect the fifth amendment right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination, See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
Although the Miranda decision was initially believed to have created a right in and of
itself, i.e., the right to have rights read prior to an interrogation, the Court has subsequently
held, in Michigan v. Tucker, that the rule only safeguards constitutional rights, but is not a
right in itself, and therefore, it is not mandated by the Constitution. 417 U.S. 433, 44 (1973).
The Court has drawn a distinction between technical violations and substantive violations
of a suspect's fifth amendment rights. In drawing this distinction, the Court has held that
the Miranda rules sweep more broadly than the fifth amendment. Therefore, the Court has
indicated that a violation of the Miranda rules may not always result in a violation of the fifth
amendment. See Oregon v. Elstad for a more complete discussion of this distinction. 470 U.S.
298 (1985), on remand, State v. Elstad, 78 Or. App. 362, 717 l'.2d 174, rev. denied, 302 Or. 36,
726 1'.2d 935 (1986).
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Miranda's impact stemmed, from the bright-line rules that it
created which became authoritative guidelines for the states. 227 With
Miranda, a noteworthy shift occurred from the Court's previous
acquiescence to state authority in criminal matters to close federal
governmental supervision. 223 States shifted away from establishing
their own standards for police procedure in accordance with their
respective state constitutions, and instead, adopted the federal stan-
dards imposed by the Court. 229 In recent years, however, many
states have begun to rely on their own constitutions in criminal
matters, partially due to the emerging conservative bloc on the
Supreme Court that has restricted Miranda's application, in order
to provide greater protections for individual liberties than those
recognized by the United States. Supreme Court. 23°
Miranda further established a set of guidelines that have a
beneficial impact on the conduct of law enforcement officers.23 '
Despite the lambasting of Miranda from conservative circles,232 few
can disagree that Miranda has held police to a higher standard of
conduct that serves to legitimize methods of law enforcement in the
eyes of the public. 233 Although conservative critics have often lik-
ened these guidelines to chains that bind police behavior, 234 it is
clear that Miranda's edicts have placed an important check on police
power and have outlined the rules of the game that, if followed,
will provide a conviction without the need for searching inquiry
into the "voluntariness" case-by-case approach. 235
In creating bright-line rules, however, the Miranda Court erred
in removing judicial discretion from the trial courts and imposing
a stringent standard from above. Despite the fact that bright-line
rules simplify judicial analysis, these rules do not always take into
account the possible exceptions and distinctions that reduce the
application of the rule to an unjust exercise in legal formalism. The
Miranda decision responded to the widespread police abuses asso-
222 See Sonenshein, .supra note 15, at 4 13-14 .
22" See Crossley, supra note 23, at 1698-99.
229 Id.
'4"' See id. at 1699- 1701.
See BAKER, .supra note 3, at 405-06.
"2 See supra note 197.
"3 See Edwards, An Opportunity for Upgrading Police Standards, in A NEw LOOK AT CONFES-
SIONS: E5COBEDO 'rim SECOND ROUND 47-63 (,l. George ed. 1967) for a discussion of the
beneficial impact of Miranda on the conduct of police officers interrogating criminal suspects,
'2"' See BAKER, supra note 3, at 183; and see also supra note 197.
2  See Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 413-14.
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dated with custodial interrogations. Pre-Miranda police practices,
encompassing physical brutality and psychological abuse in order
to get a suspect's confession, were inherently illegitimate. The-Mi-
randa decision was necessary, and thus proper within its context,
because it attacked substantive violations of a suspect's fifth amend-
ment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.
In its attack on these substantive fifth amendment violations,
Miranda's bright-line rules created per se violations in the event that
police officers did not completely abide by Miranda. Such technical
violations could be used to render evidentiary useful confessions
inadmissible in criminal trials. Given the dangers of allowing guilty
offenders to walk free, many predominantly conservative critics
objected to the scope of Miranda. Although Miranda had a beneficial
impact on law enforcement procedures, the Court went too far in
establishing bright-line rules capable of overturning probative evi-
dentiary statements due to a technical violation of the rules.
As a result, the Burger Court properly carved inroads in Mi-
randa through its broad interpretation of the defendant's waiver.
Although the Warren Court recognized the limited utility of a to-
tality of the circumstances approach in determining the validity of
a suspect's waiver of the Miranda rights, the Burger Court exploited
this loophole as a means of cutting back the Miranda decision itself.
By including implied waivers of the rights to remain silent and to
speak to an attorney; the Burger Court effectively revitalized the
use of the totality of the circumstances test that the Warren Court
tried to remove in Miranda. Thus, through a broad interpretation
of the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary requirements for a sus-
pect's waiver, subsequent Courts have bypassed the application of
the strict bright-line rules regarding the admissibility of a suspect's
confession, in order to limit Miranda's scope.
B. The Burger Court and the Trend Towards Narrowing Miranda
The Warren Court's liberal majority began to change in 1969
when President Richard Nixon appointed Warren Burger, a noted
conservative opposed to the use of exclusionary rules, to replace
Chief Justice Earl Warren. 236 Warren Burger viewed cases like Mi-
randa as impediments to the efficacy of the criminal justice system. 237
He criticized the Court's activism in usurping the legislature's role .
"" See id. at 406 n.8.
257 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 194.
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and creating rules of criminal procedure based solely on the isolated
events of individual cases.'" Instead, Burger believed that these
issues were better left to the state legislatures, which had sufficiently
greater expertise in these matters than the Justices of the Supreme
Court.'" During his last three years as a federal judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Burger voted
to affirm convictions in eighty-two of the ninety-four criminal cases
in which he was involved. 2"
In that same year, Nixon appointed Harry Blackmun to replace
Associate Justice Abe Fortas. 2'" Blackmun, when dealing with mat-
ters of criminal procedure, approached the issues in a conservative
manner, respecting the institutions of government by adopting a
laissez-faire attitude.242 Believing that the judiciary ought not in-
volve itself in the formation of public policy, Blackmun possessed a
philosophy of judicial restraint. 2" Although Blackmun had little
exposure to Miranda cases as a federal judge, his general deference
to government prompted him to decide in favor of the prosecution
in at least eighty-one percent of the criminal cases that he heard in
the years preceding his appointment to the United States Supreme
Court. 21 '
In 1971, Nixon appointed Lewis Powell to replace Associate
Justice Hugo Black. 24  Prior to his appointment, Powell expressed
fears that the Warren Court had limited the powers of the police
by expanding the rights of the accused. 24" Disagreeing with this
approach, Powell advocated "greater protection — not of criminals
but of law-abiding citizens." 247 Consistent with this philosophy, Pow-
ell advocated a return to the voluntariness standard that Miranda
had supplanted.'"
Finally, in 1972, Nixon's fourth appointee, William Rehnquist,
replaced Associate justice John Marshall Harlan, who had dissented
in Miranda. 24 ' Known as a staunch conservative, Rehnquist: clerked
238 Id. at 195.
239 id.
" 4" id. at 194.
See Sonenshein, supra note I5, at 406 ».8.
242 See BAKER, supra note 3, at 305.
243 Id. at. 304.
241 Id. at 305.
Id. at 320.
2 ' 1 " See id.
247 Id. at. 322 (quoting Powell, Richmond Time3•i,spatch, Aug. 1, 1971, in N. Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1971, 1.47).
" 4 /d. at 322.
249 id. at 323.
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for Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson upon graduating from
Stanford Law Schoo1. 25 " In one of his early political speeches, Rehn-
quist openly criticized the "left wing of the Supreme Court — Earl
Warren, William 0. Douglas, and Hugo Black — who, he charged,
were making the Constitution say what they wanted it to say.'' 251
Following the Republican victory in the White House in 1968, Rehn-
quist received an appointment to the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel. While working for the Justice Department, Rehn-
quist advocated the D.C. crime bill, which contained a provision
relating to preventive detention, which passed in 1970. 252 With
Rehnquist's appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Rich-
ard Nixon had succeeded in placing four conservatives on the
Court, many of whom had expressed concern over Miranda's scope.
In 1975, President Gerald Ford appointed John Paul Stevens
to replace Associate Justice William 0. Douglas, leaving Justice
William Brennan as the sole "survivor" from the Miranda major-
ity. 253 While serving as a federal appellate judge for five years,
Stevens voted to allow the admission of confessions in nine of the
eleven cases addressing Miranda issues that appeared before the
court:254 Although it appeared that this appointment would leave
only two Miranda supporters, Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Stevens proved himself to be unpredictable. Rather than join the
emerging conservative bloc of the Court on Miranda issues, he
became one of Miranda's leading advocates on the Conrt. 255
In the years following Miranda, a marked trend towards nar-
rowing the decision began to develop under the Burger Court. In
dealing with the waiver issue, the Burger Court loosened the stricter
standards imposed by the Miranda decision, and recognized the
validity of waivers in certain circumstances. 256 Although the Court
created the bright-line rules in Miranda to check police power, the
25" Id. at 322-23.
251 Id. at 323.
252m.
'4" Id. at 387.
254 Id. at 388.
255 1d. at 389.
"6 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (Court upheld suspect's waiver despite
the fact that the police failed to inform him that his sister had already provided him with an
attorney); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (Court deemed juvenile suspect's request
for a probation officer to be an implicit waiver of his right to have an attorney present during
interrogation); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (suspect's actions prior to his
interrogation were sufficient to imply a waiver of his rights to remain silent and to have an
attorney present during the interrogation).
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Burger Court rejected the rigid application of these rules and in-
stead, actively used the earlier case-by-case totality of the circum-
stances approach. Because bright-line - rules often reduce judicial
discretion, the Miranda decision went too far in allowing criminal
suspects, after making incriminating statements, the opportunity to
exploit the interrogators' technical violations of Miranda to reverse
convictions resting on the strength of those statements.'" The
Burger Court, through a totality of the circumstances approach,
restored judicial discretion in this area.
One of the first inroads carved by the Burger Court concerned
the validity of a second interrogation following a suspect's request
to remain silent. In Michigan v. Mosley for example, the Court side-
stepped the Miranda requirement that interrogation must cease if
the suspect wishes to remain silent. 258 By treating the suspect's
statement as waiving the right to remain silent, the Court effectively
created an avenue for admitting the statement which resulted from
the second interrogation. Rather, than apply Miranda's rules blindly,
the Mosley Court demonstrated that courts should look to the totality
of the circumstances to determine if the suspect waived his or her
right to remain silent. 259 As a result, the Court prevented Miranda
from becoming a set of rules that Create per se violations of the
fifth amendment.
The Court's clearest departure from Miranda revolves around
express and implied waivers of a suspect's rights. In Miranda, the
Court stated that only an express waiver could constitute a valid
waiver. 260 The Supreme Court, however, in North Carolina v. But-
257
	
Agronsky, Meese v. Miranda: The Final Connldown, 73 A.B.A. J. 86-92 (November
1,1987). This commentator fticuses on the efforts of Attorney General Edwin Meese 111 to
have courts overturn the Miranda decision. In describing Meese's attack on the seminal
decision that created stringent bright-line rules governing the admissibility of confessions
obtained after custodial interrogations, Agronsky recalls the story of gang member Ronnie
Gaspard who successfully exploited a Miranda bright-line rule to win his freedom. The police
arrested Gaspard for the murder of Denise Hubbard Sanders after she had testified against
him in a drug-trafficking case. The officers informed Gaspard of his Miranda rights before
conducting the interrogation. Gaspard requested to have an attorney present and shortly
thereafter, volunteered a statement to the police confessing his murder of•Ms, Sanders. The
district court, noting that Gaspard's attorney was not present when the statement was made,
reversed the conviction. Lacking other evidence linking Gaspard with the crime, the police
were forced to set him free. Id. at SO,
"" SIT Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,102-03 (1975).
2"" Id. at 104-05. The Mosley Court considered the following variables: first, the 2 hour
interval between the first and second interrogations: second, different officers conducted the
second interrogation; and, third, the questiOns in the second interrogation had a different
focus. Id.
2"" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475 (1966).
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ler, 26 ' recognized the validity of an implied waiver and thus departed
from Miranda's express waiver requirement. By recognizing implied
waivers, the Court began to move away from Miranda's bright-line
rules and increase the category of acceptable waivers necessary for
admitting a suspect's confession. As a result, the Court resurrected
the totality of the circumstances test to determine the admissibility
of a suspect's statement absent an express waiver. 262 The Butler
Court's approach properly recognizes that circumstances exist in
which the suspect's actions and words clearly demonstrate an effec-
tive waiver of his or her constitutional rights, although the suspect
has not done so expressly. For the Court to require an express
waiver would negate the validity of confessions obtained from sus-
pects whose actions clearly demonstrated that they understood and
waived their rights.
Although the Burger Court has limited the Miranda decision,
it did not completely reject the framework that the Warren Court
established. For example, Edwards v. Arizona, 265 which dealt with the
defendant's right to request an attorney in a second, uninitiated
interrogation, signals a temporary victory for criminal suspects.
Despite the Court's apparent reluctance to extend and apply the
Miranda decision, Edwards seems to reflect the seriousness that the
Court places on a suspect's right to an attorney, by protecting the
sanctity of the fifth amendment once the suspect has requested an
attorney. Unlike the Mosley decision, Edwards focused on the im-
portance of the right to an attorney and the Court's reluctance to
imply a waiver of that right in a second interrogation where the
defendant did not initiate the subsequent communications. 264 More-
over, because Mosley involved a confession during a second inter-
rogation but did not involve the right to an attorney, the Court
seemed willing to imply a waiver of the right to remain silent. 265
Thus, the Court apparently recognized the validity of the frame-
work established in the Miranda decision insofar as a suspect's Mi-
randa right to an attorney is concerned.
Although Edwards stands in clear contrast to the decisions that
limit Miranda and bypass its bright-line rules,' a closer analysis of
Miranda's language explains the Court's actions. Unlike other cases
26 ' North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
262 Id. at 374-76.
263 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980.
264 See. Sonenshein, supra note 15, at 449 n.261.
262 See id at 449 n.261.
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in which the Court exploited the ambiguities in Miranda's waiver
requirement, the Burger Court in Edwards enjoyed little flexibility
to depart from the clear dictates of Miranda regarding the proce-
dure to be followed after a suspect has requested an attorney. The
Miranda Court specifically stated that "[i]f the individual states that
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney
is present." 2" In light of this clear language, the Burger Court
could not depart from Miranda without specifically overruling the
Miranda Court's requirement:. Thus, Edwards exemplifies the Burger
Court's reluctance to overrule Miranda's clear language where no
leeway exists to allow the Court to bypass the application of Miran-
da's bright-line rules.
In fact, Edwards actually places a further limitation on Miranda
by recognizing an exception to Miranda's clear language regarding
the procedures to be followed after the suspect requests an attorney.
Miranda clearly prohibited interrogators from continuing an inter-
rogation, after the suspect invoked the right to counsel, until the
attorney arrived. The Edwards Court qualified Miranda's clear lan-
guage by allowing the police to interrogate a suspect following that
suspect's request for an attorney if he or she initiated further com-
munications with the police. The Court has, in effect, neutralized
Miranda's bright-line requirement with this "initiation" exception by
creating yet another ambiguous standard which accords trial courts
much discretion in determining which statements and actions of a
suspect: constitute "inifiation." 2"7 Although Edwards outwardly pays
homage to Miranda, the Court's recognition of the "initiation" ex-
ception places additional limits on the seminal decision, demonstrat-
ing that this "pro-Miranda" decision actually maintains the trend
towards narrowing Miranda's scope.
Notwithstanding the Burger Court's recognition of the impor-
tance of the Miranda. right to an attorney, Moran v. 13urbine2"8 dem-
onstrates that the suspect, and not a third party, must request the
attorney in order for the fifth amendment.privilege to be invoked:26"
If the suspect has no reason to know that someone has obtained an
attorney for him or her, this lack of knowledge will not impair the
26' 1 Miranda, 584 U.S. at 474.
2"7 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, on remand, 66 Or. App. 585, 674 P.2d 1190,
rev. denied, 296 Or. 712 (1983) (Court upheld defendant's waiver by ruling that the defen-
dant's inquiry of "What will happen tO rue now?" constituted initiation of communication
within the meaning of Edwards a. Arizona, 455 U.S. 477 (1981)).
2"8 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
21"' Id. at 421-23.	 •
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suspect's subsequent waiver of his or her Miranda rights. 270
 The
Moran decision also reflects the Court's position that the police need
not supply the suspect with all necessary information prior to the
waiver, even if that information would be likely to have affected the
suspect's decision to waive his or her rights. 271
The Moran decision properly avoided placing an affirmative
duty on the police to apprise the suspect of all relevant information
prior to the suspect's decision to waive his or her rights. Although
the burden on the police would have been minimal in the Moran
case, the Miranda decision serves to restrict police overreaching, but
not to create affirmative duties of disclosing information to criminal
suspects. The Miranda decision merely requires that the police must
inform a suspect of his or her right to have an attorney present
during interrogation. 272 The police cannot interfere with the sus-
pect's decision to exercise that right, but they also should not have
to facilitate the suspect's exercise of that right. The convenience of
having an attorney waiting down the hall might have influenced the
Moran suspect to exercise his right to an attorney, but the police in
no way interfered with the suspect's decision to waive that right.
Using the totality of circumstances approach, the Court correctly
held that the appellant's confession was admissible despite the fail-
ure of the police to inform the suspect that his attorney was located
nearby.273
The Burger Court has, in effect restored judicial discretion in
this area of criminal procedure by resurrecting the totality of the
279 Id. at 423-29. Moran v. Burbine also demonstrates conflicting approaches to the Mi-
randa decision. The conservative bloc focuses on the actions of the police in Miranda cases,
id., while the liberal dissenters (Brennan, Marshall and Stevens) look to the knowledge and
awareness of the suspect. Id. at 450-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority rejects the
defendant's contention that failure to inform him of the presence of an attorney violated his
fifth amendment rights since such a contention would place a burden on police behavior. Id.
at 423-28. Otherwise, asserted the majority, police would have the burden of informing
suspects of all relevant information necessary to a waiver decision, and the police would bear
the consequences if they failed to convey such information. Id. The dissent, on the other
hand, stressed the need to inform all suspects of all information relevant to the waiver
decision, despite the additional burdens placed on the shoulders of the police. Id. at 450-56
(Stevens, J., dissenting), The conflict between the police-oriented approach of the conserva-
tives and the defendant-oriented approach of the liberals is reflected in the cases under the
Rehnquist Court, whose results are predictable given the predominance of conservative
justices in that Court.
271 Id. at 922,427.
272
	 v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,471 (1966).
27s
	
Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 423-24.
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circumstances test through its analysis of the waiver issue. The
totality approach is a more effective tool of judicial analysis than
the bright-line rules created by the Warren Court in Miranda. Al-
though the Court in its early , confession cases looked to the sur-
rounding circumstances of a confession solely to determine its trust-
worthiness, the Burger Court's application of the totality approach
balances the individual's rights in a particular case with the interests
of society in effective law enforcement. Trial judges once again may
look to the circumstances surrounding the suspect's confession to
determine if he or she rendered an implied waiver by his or her
actions during the interrogation. As a result, these courts enjoy
discretion to rule that an alleged Miranda violation was relatively
minor and ought not affect the admissibility of an evidentiary useful
confession. The Court's totality approach provides the best means
of sifting out those cases where the appellant seeks a reversal of a
conviction due to a technical violation, as opposed to a substantive
violation, of the Miranda rights.
In sum, Miranda properly sought to remedy abuses in the in-
terrogation process. The rules created by the Warren Court, how-
ever, should not be used to create per se violations of the fifth
amendment. Such a rigid approach would render many confessions
inadmissible in circumstances where the police did not engage in
physical or psychological overbearing, but instead failed to adhere
strictly to the rules outlined in Miranda. Where the substantive
violations do not occur during an interrogation, technical violations
ought not be used to render confessions inadmissible unless those
violations are so egregious that they significantly interfered with the
appellant's ability to exercise his or her constitutional rights. The
Burger Court managed to prevent such an application of Miranda
by relying on the totality of the circumstances test to determine the
nature of the "violation" and its subsequent impact on the appellant.
C. Recent Erosion of Miranda Rights Under the Rehnquist Court
In 1986, President Reagan appointed William Rehnquist as the
Chief justice of the Supreme Court following Burger's resignation.
In addition, Reagan appointed Antonin Scalia, a noted conservative,
to fill the resulting vacancy. Under Rehnquist, the Court has con-
tinued its trend towards narrowing the applicability of Miranda
through a broad interpretation of what constitutes a valid waiver.
The Rehnquist Court upheld as voluntary the waivers rendered by
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mentally incompetent individuals due to the absence of police ov-
erreaching or coercion. 2" Furthermore, the Court found that a
suspect's limited invocation of the right to counsel, requesting an
attorney for the purpose of making a written statement, did not
reflect a lack of understanding of the consequences of such decision
to justify excluding the suspect's oral statements during the inter-
rogation.275 Finally, the Court held valid a suspect's waiver of Mi-
randa rights, despite the failure of the police to inform the suspect
of the charges that would be the subject of questioning. 276 Although
the Rehnquist Court has continued the work of its predecessor, in
some cases it has gone further to create per se rules presuming
voluntary waivers where there is no affirmative evidence of police
coercion.
Indeed, Colorado v. Connelly, 277 which held valid a mentally in-
competent individual's waiver, signals a dramatic departure from
Miranda. In Connelly, the Court shifted its analytical focus from the
suspect's state of mind in determining whether a waiver is voluntary
to the officers' actions by interpreting Miranda to protect the accused
from governmental overreaching that violates their constitutional
rights. 278 Finding no violation of the suspect's rights, the Court held
that the suspect's waiver was voluntary because it was not the prod-
uct of governmental interference or coercion. 279 Thus, the Connelly
decision creates a new bright-line rule presuming the voluntariness
of a suspect's waiver absent governmental coercion. Under this
standard, unless the defendant can rebut this presumption of vol-
untariness with affirmative evidence of police coercion, the Court
will not look to factors such as the suspect's mental capacities and
illnesses to determine the voluntariness of the waiver. The Rehn-
quist Court, therefore, has limited the totality of the circumstances
approach by excluding a suspect's mental capacities from the rele-
vant inquiries into the voluntariness of the waiver, and basing vol-
untariness solely on the absence of police coercion.
In addition, the Connelly Court further departed from the Mi-
randa decision by lowering the standard of proof for judging a
suspect's waiver. Although the Miranda. Court emphasized that the
prosecution would bear a "heavy burden" of justification to dem-
274 Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
275 Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828 (1987).
2" Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
277
 107 5, Ct. 515 (1986).
27, 1d. at 523-24.
375 Id.
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onstrate that a waiver was voluntarily rendered, 28° the Connelly
Court employed a preponderance of the evidence test to the sus-
pect's waiver. 28 ' By lowering the threshold of proof for a voluntary
waiver, the Rehnquist Court has increased the number of' waivers
that courts will hold valid.
At first glance, the Connelly case seems to be consistent with
Miranda because the defendant, although mentally incompetent,
waived his rights and confessed voluntarily. The decision's incon-
sistency, however, lies in the differing interpretations of the term
"voluntary." The Miranda Court stressed the importance of the
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary requirement for a suspect's
waiver:282 As a result, courts applied a totality of the circumstances
analysis that examines the circumstances surrounding the confes-
sion, including the physical and mental state of the suspect, to
determine the voluntariness of the suspect's waiver. In contrast, the
Connelly Court demonstrated a willingness to uphold a statement as
voluntary, regardless of the suspect's mental condition, as long as
the police in no way contributed to the suspect's decision to render
the statement. 285 Connelly's exclusion of mental capabilities from the
relevant inquiries in the totality of the circumstances approach shifts
the focus of the analysis concerning voluntariness from the suspect
to the interrogating officers.
The Connelly Court has gone too far in narrowing the Miranda
decision. The Connelly holding suggests that new bright-line rules
will be applied to presume the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver.
If the Court upheld the defendant's waiver under the totality of
the circumstances test, the results would be less disturbing. By laying
the groundwork for a new bright-line rule, however, the Court may
begin to move away from the totality of the circumstances. If the
Court gradually departs from the totality test in favor of bright-line
rules presuming the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver in the ab-
sence of governmental coercion, the Rehnquist Court will apply
equally inflexible standards like those imposed by the Warren Court
in Miranda. 281 Rather than lay the groundwork for new bright-line
' 1°' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
"k Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 523.
2" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
2" Connelly, 107 S.C1. at 523.
"4 See Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987). In Smilh, the district court
addressed the validity of a mentally retarded defendants waiver in light of the Court's
holding in Colorado v. Connelly. The defendant, a mentally retarded individual with an I.Q.
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rules that supposedly rectify the imbalances created by Miranda, the
Rehnquist Court should respect the totality of the circumstances
test that the Burger Court revitalized in the twenty-two years since
the Miranda decision because that test does not bind trial judges to
apply presumptions that overlook the factual nuances of each case.
In contrast, the Rehnquist Court in Connecticut v. Barrett28
 con-
tinued the trend towards narrowing, but not abrogating, the appli-
cation of the Miranda decision by preventing the defendant from
avoiding prosecution by claiming that he failed to realize the con-
sequences of his limited invocation of the right to counsel. Like the
Burger Court's decision in Edwards v. Arizona,28" Barrett dealt with
the suspect's right to have an attorney present throughout the in-
terrogation. In Barrett, however, the accused stated that he would
talk to the police, but he refused to sign a written statement without
his attorney present. 287
 In admitting the oral confessions, the
Court's decision was consistent with Edwards because it recognized
the importance of the accused's right to an attorney, although it
limited this right to the suspect's written statements, and measured
the voluntariness of the suspect's waiver in accordance with the
totality of the circumstances.
The Barrett decision demonstrates the Rehnquist Court's re-
luctance to reverse convictions for minor, or technical violations of
Miranda. Barrett suggests that the Court will not invalidate waivers
in cases where a suspect clearly understands his or her rights and
has been given the opportunity to fully exercise those rights, but
seeks a reversal of the conviction by exploiting perceived technical
violations of the Miranda decision. The Court's reluctance to reverse
convictions based on technical violations becomes clearer when com-
paring Barrett to previous Supreme Court decisions such as Edwards.
of 65, applied to the district court for habeas corpus relief after receiving the death penalty
for a murder conviction. Id. at 501. The district court distinguished Connelly in noting than
... Connelly deals primarily with the voluntary requirement of Miranda as op-
posed to the knowing and intelligent portion of the Miranda requirement. The
court does not doubt that Smith's confession was given under his own free will,
but the court finds that Smith did not knowingly and intelligently confess and
waive his right to counsel. Thus, the Connelly case does not mandate that this
court deny petitioner's habeas.
Id. at 506 (emphasis added). The Smith case, therefore, demonstrates the stringency of the
Connelly standards as applied to mentally deficient individuals. Only by relying on the other
components of a Miranda waiver, the knowing and intelligent requirements, can a court
effectively bypass the Connelly holding and look to the defendant's mental capabilities in
determining the validity of the waiver.
2" 107 S. Ct. 828 (1987).
2m 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
2" Barrett, 107 S. Ct. at 830.
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In Edwards, the Court held that a suspect's request for an attorney
during an initial interrogation invalidated a waiver rendered in a
subsequent interrogation.'" The Barrett Court, in holding that the
defendant waived his rights where he requested that an attorney
be present during a written statement, rejected the applicability of
Edwards. ' "`' Given the facts of Barrett, the use of Edwards to invalidate
the suspect's confession clearly would have contradicted the sus-
pect's expressed desire to speak with the police as long as the police
honored his right to have his attorney present before rendering a
written statement. In not applying Edwards, furthermore, the Barrett
Court properly avoided rendering the suspect's confession invalid
by allowing him to exploit a Miranda technicality to escape prose-
cution.
After Barrett, the Rehnquist Court will not likely accord great
weight to the intelligence requirement for the waiver decision. The
Court rejected the defendant's claim that his limited invocation of
the right to counsel reflected a lack of understanding of his rights
so as to invalidate the oral statements subsequently obtained. In
rejecting this claim, the Court observed that "[t]he fact that some
might find Barrett's decision illogical is irrelevant, for we have never
'embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full con-
sequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness.'" 290 The Bar-
rett decision, therefore, reflects the Court's refusal to second-guess
the intelligence of a defendant's decision to waive his or her Miranda
rights. Thus, the Barrett Court applied a liberal interpretation to
the requirement that a waiver be the product of an intelligent
decision by upholding the validity of the defendant's waiver despite
the fact that it may not have been well-reasoned.
Finally, Colorado v. Spring`" completes the analysis of the Rehn-
quist Court's erosion of Miranda. In Spring, the Court held that the
knowing component of a valid waiver does not require the police
to inform a suspect about the specific crimes for which he or she is
being interrogated. 292 The Spring decision applied the Burger
Court's earlier decision in Moran v. Burbine293 which eroded the
knowing component of the waiver requirement in holding that an
accused need not be apprised of all information relevant to a waiver
"" Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485-87.
28" Barrett, 107 S. Ct. at 832.
290 Id. at 833.
" I
 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
292 1d. at 859.
"" 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
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decision. Once the officers read the warnings, the suspect is on
notice "that anything that he [she] says may be used against him
[her]."294
 The Court's approach, therefore, encompasses all possible
responses to the questions, not merely those responses relating to
the charges that the suspect believes to be the interrogation's focus.
Similar to the Rehnquist CoUrt's Barrett decision, the Spring
decision suggests that the Court is reluctant to exclude probative
confessions on the basis of a perceived technical violation of a
suspect's Miranda rights. In Spring, the police had apprised the
defendant fully of his rights and afforded him ample opportunity
to exercise these rights. The Court correctly upheld the defendant's
waiver because the defendant knowingly and willfully volunteered
information about the murder he committed. It is illogical to assume
that the suspect could have actually believed that his murder confes-
sion would not be used against him because he rendered the confes-
sion in an interrogation that had not been prefaced with a warning
that the murder would be discussed during the interrogation. Rec-
ognizing that the suspect understood his constitutional rights, the
Court, in Spring, again refused to reverse a conviction on the basis
of a technicality.
In sum, Colorado v. Connelly, 295 Connecticut v. Barrett, 296 and Col-
orado v. Spring, 297
 demonstrate that the Rehnquist Court has contin-
ued the trend towards narrowing Miranda's application to confes-
sion cases by interpreting broadly what constitutes a valid waiver.
Given the trend begun by the Burger Court, and the dominant
conservative bloc on the Rehnquist Court, the results in the recent
cases are predictable. In Barrett and in Spring, the Rehnquist Court
demonstrated a reluctance to reverse convictions based on techni-
calities, because the technical violations that the defendants asserted
in no way deprived them of their fifth amendment right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination. In Connelly, however, the Rehn-
quist Court moved from the totality of the circumstances test, res-
urrected by the Burger Court's broad interpretation of acceptable
waivers, to a bright-line test that presumes the voluntariness of a
suspect's waiver in the absence of governmental coercion: Such a
shift to a more conservative approach results in the same inflexible
standards that critics of the Miranda decision objected to and the
Burger Court subsequently sought to correct.
294
 Spring, 107 S. Ct. at 859.
295
 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
295
 107 S. Ct. 828 (1987).
"7
 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
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CONCLUSION
In all, the Rehnquist Court's recent decisions of Connecticut v.
Barrett and Colorado v. Spring do not depart radically from the
Warren Court's Miranda decision, but instead, are a logical extension
of the Burger Court's approach to the Miranda rule. Viewed against
the backdrop of a conservative Court with a markedly different
philosophy than the Warren Court, the Court's post-Miranda deci-
sions move away from protecting an individual's constitutional
rights towards balancing society's needs against those individual
rights. Although Miranda served an important purpose in placing
a check on the power of police in conducting interrogations, the
recent trend in the Court reflects a philosophy that Miranda should
not be applied in cases involving technical violations of a suspect's
rights, as opposed to the substantive violations that Miranda sought
to rectify.
In limiting the applicability of Miranda, however, the Rehnquist
Court has gone further than its conservative predecessor, the
Burger Court. The Rehnquist Court has articulated a standard
governing the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver that creates a
presumption of voluntariness absent coercive police activity. In
doing so, the Court has excluded a suspect's mental capacities from
the relevant inquiries in the totality of the circumstances analysis.
By creating such standards, the Rehnquist Court shows that it may
move much farther from Miranda than the Burger Court. In carry-
ing on the task of limiting Miranda as it applies to waiver issues, the
Rehnquist. Court should not allow the pendulum to swing too far
to the right, thereby destroying the valuable protections of Miranda.
Additionally, if the Rehnquist Court cuts back on individual rights
too radically, it may sow the seeds for a future liberal Court to swing
back to solely protecting individual rights and, thus, create a stur-
dier shield for criminals and impede the effective administration of
criminal justice.
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